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ABSTRACT 
This thesis analyzes instability in the Horn of Africa focusing specifically to the Ethiopia-
Eritrea border conflict fought between the two countries in 1998-2000. It provides a 
historical background of both countries, and how they were influenced by external actors 
and subsequent federation of Eritrea into Ethiopia in 1950. The study then examines the 
termination of Eritrean federation, which sparked the emergence of secession movements 
culminating to Eritrea’s independence in 1993.    
Among the notable findings of the study are that the two countries signed a total 
of twenty-five protocols by September 1993, which included among other things, a joint 
defense pact and trade agreements but were not implemented. Economic and border 
incompatibilities served as sources of tension between the two countries. Despite the 
signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement, the African Union and the international 
community have failed to resolve this conflict, and it remains a potential flashpoint in the 
Horn of Africa.  
The recommendations include pursuing a political compromise over the symbolic 
village of Badme and placing it under the sovereignty of a condominium administered by 
both states and then addressing other sources of interdependence. Additionally, the 
international community needs to pressurize both countries to fully democratize.  
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With the possible exception of Australia, historically, all continents have 
witnessed border disputes, some of which have turned violent. Of no continent is this 
truer than Africa. At present, Benin has disputes with Togo, Burkina Faso and Nigeria; 
Sudan has frontier differences with Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Chad and the Central 
African Republic; Libya, Niger and Chad disagree on where their respective borders 
should lie; Equatorial Guinea has frontier quarrels with Gabon, Nigeria and Cameroon; 
and Tanzania and Malawi squabble over the border of Lake Nyassa. Some of these 
territorial disputes are fuelled by a quest to control resources such as oil, minerals, fish, 
timber, or other shared resources like water. For example the Bakassi Peninsula between 
Nigeria and Cameroon has abundant fish and possibly, oil deposits, the Aozou region 
between Chad and Libya is rich in uranium deposits, and the Corisco Bay between 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon has oil prospects. However, none of Africa’s border 
disputes have erupted into wars of the magnitude of that fought between Ethiopia and 
Eritrea from May 1998 to June 2000.1 
The frontier dispute between the two countries was the product of the annexation 
of Eritrea by Ethiopia in 1962 which ended the federation which had been sanctioned by 
the United Nations (UN) since 1950. In 1991, Eritrea launched an independence bid in 
the wake of a revolution that overthrew the brutal Mengistu Haile Mariam’s regime [also 
referred to as the Derg or Dergue]2 in Addis Ababa. Eritrea’s independence in 1993 left 
                                                 
1 Kidane Mengisteab and Okbzaghi Yohannes, Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic 
and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independent Eritrea (The Red Sea Press, 2005), 238–239. 
2 The term Derg or Dergue is Amharic for “council” or “committee.” It became the popular name for 
the post-imperial Marxist Ethiopian regime of Mengistu Haile Mariam (1974–1991).  The overthrow of the 
Mengistu regime in 1991 in Addis Ababa was achieved through the joint effort of two rebel forces, Eritrean 
People’s Liberation Front (EPLF) and Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), in 
exchange of which they agreed Eritrea would secede. The core component of the EPRDF was Tigrayan 
People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), operating in the province of Tigray that adjoins Eritrea. It took the ELF 
and TPLF guerilla movements 30 years of fighting in order to defeat the Ethiopian Military dictatorship. 
After secession, EPRF under the leadership of Meles Zenawi and EPLF under the leadership of Isaayas 
Afeworki formed transitional governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea, respectively. 
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Ethiopia landlocked (Figure 1). Although many Ethiopians were opposed to the secession 
of Eritrea, the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPFDF) transitional 
government under Meles Zenawi contended that it was an essential move to resolving the 
conflict that had “bedeviled” the country for the previous thirty years.3 Nonetheless, after 
Eritrea’s independence in 1993, the two states continued to have warm and cordial 
relations affording free trade and movement across the common borders for their mutual 
benefit.4 President Issayas Afeworki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi had been 
“comrades in combat” for more than a decade, had defeated a common enemy [the Derg], 
and projected an image of unanimity that proved to be something of a public myth.5  
In May 1998, longstanding political and economic tensions erupted in a war 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea that lasted for two years. The main trigger for this war was 
a border dispute in the village of Badme.6  The international community sent a United 
Nations Peacekeeping Mission to Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE) in December 2000, at 
the request of the two parties, to oversee the ceasefire and demilitarization of the border 
area, as well as appoint an independent Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Commission (EEBC) 
charged with demarcating the 621-mile boundary. Both countries promised to accept the 
EEBCs demarcation as final and binding.7 Initially, the peace process progressed well 
without any recurrence of conflicts, and when the Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) 
[Figure 2] was demarcated on the Eritrean side of the de facto border in early 2001, the 
                                                 
3 The first Eritrea secession movement—Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) emerged in 1961. Also see 
Sally Healy, “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements 
Unravel,” Chatham House (2008), 12, at:  
http://www.riftvalley.net/resources/file/healyhornafrica_2008.pdf  (accessed January 20, 2010). 
4 Elise Barth, “The United Nations Mission in Eritrea/Ethiopia: Gender(ed) Effects,” Oslo: 
International Peace Research Institute (2004), 10, at: 
http://www.prio.no/sptrans/1239824168/Gender_Aspects_of_Conflict_Interventions_(full-text).pdf  
(accessed February 14, 2010). 
5 Richard Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with 
Tigray, from Liberations struggle to Interstate Wars," Africa: Journal of the International African Institute 
Vol. 73, No. 3 (2003), 369–401. 
6 Healy, “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements 
Unravel,” 19. 
7 Jon H.S. Lie, “UNMEE:Deterioration and Termination,” Institute of International Affairs, (2009), 
10, at: http://www.peacebuilding.no/eng/Publications/Noref-Reports2/Noref-Report-19-UNMEE-
deterioration-and-termination.  (accessed February 24, 2010). 
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Ethiopians withdrew their troops by March 2001. However, the outcome of the EEBC 
was rejected by Ethiopia when the village that started the war, Badme, was placed on the 
Eritrean side of the border prompting heightened tensions. As a result of years of failure 
of the United Nations to enforce the mediated agreement, Eritrea reciprocated by banning 
helicopter flights and limiting fuel supplies and rations to UN forces, which prompted the 
organization to prematurely end the mission in July 2008. 
Conflict resolution is a delicate process that requires an in-depth understanding of 
the deep-rooted sources of a crisis and the problems associated with management.8 This 
study of the Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict endeavors to answer the following questions: 
1.  What are the fundamental causes that led to the crisis? 
2.  Why has it remained unresolved? 
3.  Which stakeholders need to be involved to secure the peace and 
reconciliation process? 
Invariably, understanding regional and international dynamics in relation to this 
crisis is essential. The task of reconciling the people of these two states is a daunting one 
that will require a coordinated approach by all stakeholders to prevent spoilers from 
impeding the process. This thesis is based on the premise that a thorough understanding 
of the historical dynamics of the conflict offers an important first step in designing 
policies that will help  to restore stability in the Horn of Africa (HOA). Of course, all 
crises are the product of unique circumstances, with their own history, leadership 
personalities, and sets of issues to be resolved. However, they also encompass common 
characteristics, above all, the requirement for foreign intervention.9 It is hoped that a 
dispassionate analysis of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border conflict will expose potential pitfalls 
in conflict resolution and might serve as a guide to resolve future disputes of this nature.  
                                                 
8 Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse,  and Hugh Miall, Contemporay Conflict Resolution (Malden: 
Polity Press, 2005), 18. 
9  Most post-1945 conflicts do not spontaneously resolve themselves. They often require a third party 
to move the peacemaking forward. Also see Chester A. Croker, Turbulent Peace: The Challenges of 




Figure 1.   Horn of Africa10 
                                                 
10 From: United Nations, http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/horne-r.pdf (Accessed 




The border stalemate in conjunction with the underlying problems of authoritarian 
political processes and fragile governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea are linked to larger 
conflicts in the Horn of Africa.11  The two states compete in supporting rival parties and 
armed groups in neighboring states. They both have used proxy wars carried out by 
armed insurgent groups such the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), the Ogaden National 
Liberation Front (ONLF), and the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front (EPPF) to 
undermine each other.12 Ethiopia supports Sheikh Sharif Sheikh Ahmed and the 
dysfunctional Transitional Federal Government (TFG) in Somalia. Eritrea has extended 
support to rebels from eastern Sudan and Darfur, as well as arming anti-Ethiopian forces 
in Somalia with the hope of tying down Ethiopian forces in their own Ogaden region 
away from the Eritrean border. Eritrea has also provided sanctuary and military 
assistance to these groups and has sought to infiltrate fighters into Ethiopia via Sudan and 
Somalia. The two countries’ deeply ingrained rivalries create the conditions for perpetual 
conflict.   
On a humanitarian scale, the 1998–2000 war between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
claimed some 100,000 lives and produced more than a million internally displaced 
persons (IDP),13 as well as  squandering a generation of development opportunities.14 The 
war was also attended by deportations of the citizens of the opposing states. Ethiopia 
expelled approximately 75,000 Eritreans and Ethiopians of Eritrean origin, while Eritrea 
deported 60,000 Ethiopians and Eritreans of Ethiopian origin.15  These IDPs languish in 
                                                 
11 Terrence Lyons, "Avoiding Conflict in Horn of Africa: U.S Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea," 
Council on Foreign Relations,  21 (December 2006), 9. 
 12 International Crisis Group, “Beyond the Fragile Peace Between Ethiopia and Eritrea: Averting new 
war,” Africa Report,  141 (17 June 2008), 13, at:  http://www.cmi.no/sudan/doc/?id=1014 (accessed 
February 14, 2010). 
 13 Jonathan Ewing, “Ethiopia and Eritrea in Turmoil: Implications for Peace and Security in a 
Troubled Region,” Institute For Security Studies Report (December 2008), 2, at: 
http://centirene.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/SITREPETHERIT301108.PDF?link_
id=22&slink_id=7067&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3 (accessed February 28, 2010). 
14 Lyons, "Avoiding Conflict in Horn of Africa: U.S Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea," 7. 
15 Martin Plaut, The conflict and its aftermath in Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War 
(Asmara: Red Sea Press 2004), 119. 
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camps permanently, relying on relief food. The Eritrean government declared a state of 
emergency in 2000 thereby halting any form of development, including the 
implementation of a new constitution. Both governments have used the pretext of 
counterterrorism and states of emergency to silence the opposition and to repress the 
populace. This unstable situation is breeding radicals in the two countries. It is imperative 
for new solutions to be offered to defuse tensions at the earliest opportunity and resolve 
this prolonged stalemate before a new conflict breaks out.  
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESIS 
While Eritrea has had border conflicts with Yemen, Djibouti, and Sudan,16 the 
magnitude of its tensions with these neighbors pales in comparison with its relations with 
Ethiopia. The current situation notwithstanding, the people of Ethiopia and Eritrea had 
lived in harmony, intermarried, and shared common ambitions for centuries. The people 
of Tigray and the highland Eritreans share the same culture and language, Tigrinya. 
Indeed, even the Prime Minister Meles Zenawi is of Eritrean origin on his mother’s side. 
Moreover, Eritrea was a part of the Ethiopian empire until 1991 when the country gained 
independence.17 
The first argument presented in thesis is that the Ethiopian and Eritrean border 
conflict is politically manipulated, and not the result of inherent ethnic, tribal, or racial 
differences. Traditional conflict resolution and mediation mechanisms have been 
systematically and deliberately eroded by the policies of both regimes. The two states 
have institutionalized a set of disagreements and contradictions that have plagued 
relations between them since Eritrea’s liberation struggle.18  
Secondly, it can be argued that the international community has proved powerless 
to overcome resistance of the local actors who have sabotaged the implementation 
framework designed in the Algiers Agreement to achieve actual border demarcation. For 
                                                 
16 Lyon, "Avoiding Conflict in Horn of Africa: U.S Policy toward Ethiopia and Eritrea," 6. 
17 Paul Collier, Wars, Guns And Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places (New York: HarperCollins, 
2009), 177. 
18 Reid, "Old Problems in New Conflicts: Some Observations on Eritrea and its Relations with Tigray, 
from Liberations struggle to Interstate Wars," 371. 
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its part, the United Nations has failed to pressure Ethiopia to accept the boundary with 
Eritrea as defined by the international law. Another major international actor, the United 
States, preoccupied by its “War on Terror,” has taken a “back seat” in the dispute.19  For 
these reasons, the prospects for conflict resolution do not look good.  
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Since authors’ opinions on the root cause of Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict are deeply 
divided, this thesis will summarize a variety of theories and classify the causes into three 
main categories - those by authors’ who argue that the conflict is rooted in economic 
conditions, those authors’ who view it as a result of a combination of economic and 
political issues, and those authors’ who attribute the conflict to political manipulation by 
both internal and external actors. The first group, the economic school, argues that 
Eritrean secession was unacceptable (by Ethiopians) especially from the Amhara and 
Oromo tribes) because it denied Ethiopia the right of access to the sea, thereby seriously 
impacting Ethiopia’s ability to export its products. According to Sally Healy, an associate 
fellow of the Africa Programme at Chatham House, the port of Assab, built to serve 
Ethiopia, fell under control of Eritrea whose trading needs were already fully met through 
the port of Massawa.20 As the result of the 1991 agreement, Ethiopia was left with no 
option but to cooperate with Djibouti and Somalia for sea access.  Anup Shar concurs that 
the major reason for conflict is Ethiopia’s lack of access to the sea. Ethiopia’s 
propaganda to its people is that they need a different regime in Eritrea more compatible 
to Ethiopia’s economic interests.21 For British journalist Michela Wrong, “Eritrea 
regarded the new war as proof that Ethiopia had never digested the loss of its coast and 
                                                 
19 John  Prendergast and Collin J. Thomas, "Blowing the Horn," Council of Foreign Relations 
(March/April 2007),  2, at:  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/20070301faessay86205/john-
prendergast-and-colin-thomas-jensen/blowing-the-horn (accessed February 11, 2010). 
20 Healy, “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements 
Unravel,” 19. 
21 Anup Shar, "Conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia," at:  
http://www.globalissues.org/article/89/conflict-between-ethiopia-and-eritrea (accessed March 6, 2010). 
8 
 
was bent on reconquest,”22 while Leenco Lata, a freelance writer on the politics of the 
Horn of Africa, attributes the conflict to trade competition between the ruling parties 
EPLF and TPLF to uplift their respective economies using resources and markets in 
Ethiopia.23   
The second school, [eclectic], combines both economic and political issues as 
causes of the conflict. Ruth Iyob, an associate professor at the University of California at 
Santa Barbara, asserts that many powerful forces drove the discord: the old rivalry 
between the two liberation fronts - the Eritrean EPLF and the Tigrayan TPLF - both of 
which  helped to free Ethiopia from Mengistu’s tyranny; economic competition over 
foreign trade; the Eritrean decision to use the newly-coined nakfa currency for the 
independent state, and the different political visions of the respective leadership cadres, 
one favoring a “hegemonic” (Ethiopian) state while the other opting for a “diasporic” 
(Eritrean) state form.24 In August 2007, Ethiopia’s Prime Minister Meles Zenawi said 
that Badme was not the pretext for Eritrean invasion in 1998, but the real reasons were 
political and economic. For Gabru Asrat, a former member of the politburo of the TPLF, 
the conflict was fanned by dual and contradicting ambitions of Eritrean leadership. Soon 
after independence, Eritrean leaders aspired to create at the earliest opportunity both a 
distinct Eritrean national identity and a robust economy comparable to that of 
Singapore.25 A Political Science lecturer at the University of South Africa in Pretoria, 
John Nyuot Yoh, also affirms that the reasons for the war were two fold—sea access for 
Ethiopia and ethnic politics in the two countries.26 
                                                 
22 Michela Wrong, I Didn't Do It For You: How The World Betrayed a Small African Nation (New 
York: Harper Collins, 2005), 19. 
23 Leenco Lata, “The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” Proceedings of 
Schorlarly Conference on Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict Held in Oslo, Norway (6–7 July 2006), 10, at 
http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/20014/20014.pdf (accessed March 6, 2010). 
 24 The term “diasporic states” is heuristic, meant to denote states whose identity is forged in struggles 
for political, economic and social survival, and the need to return to homeland. Also see Ruth Iyob, "The 
Ethiopian-Eritrean Conflict: Diasporic vs Hegemonic States in the Horn of Africa," The Journal of Modern 
African Studies Vol. 38, No. 4 (December 2000),  660–677. 
25 Lata, “The Search for Peace: The Conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea,” 10. 
26 John G. Nyuot Yoh, “Peace Processes and Conflict Resolution in the Horn of Africa,” African 
Security Review 12, 3 (2003), 86.  
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The third school argues that political manipulation by internal actors to serve 
domestic purposes is at the root of the conflict. According to Jonathan Ewing, an 
independent political analyst from the Institute of Security Studies, this conflict is a 
private battle between President Afeworki and Prime Minister Zenawi.27 Both states have 
degenerated into autocracies and both have lost their legitimacy based on trust and 
instead rely on coercion and total control.28 This explains their inability to re-establish a 
working relationship for the economic benefit of both countries.29 The two leaders also 
share a political culture in which compromise is equated with capitulation and which 
further exacerbates their personal animosity. Personal hatred and mutual suspicion 
between the two leaders is replicated by the intractable nature of the conflict. What 
scholars fail to address is the linkage of how all these factors contributed to the conflict. 
External actors like Egypt, in their pursuit to maintain dominance over the Nile 
River, have exacerbated the conflict. According to Daniel Kendie, a Professor of History 
at Henderson State University: “…as far as the Blue Nile goes it has been held that Egypt 
must be in a position either to dominate Ethiopia, or to neutralize whatever unfriendly 
regime might emerge there.”30 As the late Egyptian President Sadat once stated: “Any 
action that would endanger the waters of the Blue Nile will be faced with a firm reaction 
on the part of Egypt, even if that action should lead to war.”31  
As a sequel to this statement, an observer of the Egyptian scene recently wrote: 
Egypt is a country that has not abandoned its expansionist ambitions. It 
regards its southern neighbors as its sphere of influence. Its strategy is 
essentially negative: to prevent the emergence of any force that could 
challenge its hegemony, and to thwart any economic development along 
                                                 
27 Ewing,  “Ethiopia and Eritrea in Turmoil: Implications for Peace and Security in a Troubled 
Region,” 4. 
28 Tanja R. Muller, "State making in the Horn of Africa: notes on Eritrea and the prospects for the end 
of violent conflict in the Horn," Conflict, Security and Development, Vol. 6, No. 4 (December 2006),  503–
530. 
29 Healy, “Lost Opportunities in the Horn of Africa: How Conflicts Connect and Peace Agreements 
Unravel,” 18.  
Daniel Kendie, The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941-2004: Deciphering the Geo-
political Puzzle (Signature Book Printing, Inc. 2005), 189. 




the banks of the Nile that could either divert the flow of the water, or 
decrease its volume. The arithmetic of the waters of the Blue Nile River is, 
therefore, a zero-sum game, which Egypt is determined to win. It must 
have a hegemonic relationship with the countries of the Nile Valley and 
the Horn of Africa. When, for instance, Ethiopia is weak and internally 
divided, Egypt can rest. But when Ethiopia is prosperous and self-
confident, playing a leading role in the region, Egypt is worried.32 
While political manipulation by both internal and external actors to serve particular 
interests cannot be overruled, any attempts at resolution that are not collaborative and 
backed by political will may not be fruitful. The UNMEE that lacked a political mandate 
became “a puppet and hostage of the conflict.”33   
 
 
Figure 2.   Temporary Security Zone between Ethiopia and Eritrea34 
                                                 
32 Addis Tribune, “Egypt and the Hornof Africa,” June 26, 1998. 
33 Lie, “UNMEE:Deterioration and Termination,” 20. 




E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
This study will use a combination of qualitative analysis and process tracing to 
analyze the changes that have occurred in both Ethiopia and Eritrea and which have 
greatly impacted the conflict environment. Particular attention will be paid to the policies 
and strategies these countries’ regimes have pursued that led to and continue to sustain 
the current border stalemate and which discourage meaningful solutions. The research 
will rely mainly on secondary sources of data, such as books, journals, scholarly articles, 
internet sources, and other written material. This study will also draw on the author’s own 
experiences while serving as the operations officer with the first Kenya Demining 
Company (KENDEM I) in the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE 
III) from October 2003 to September 2004. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY 
The thesis will be structured into several sections, beginning with the current 
chapter that introduces the conflict. Chapter II will briefly cover a historical review of the 
area under study and establish the basis of tensions between Ethiopia and Eritrea that 
eventually fuelled the current conflict. In order to understand the Ethiopia-Eritrea 
conflict, the turbulent history of the two countries must be explored and their unique 
geographical position between Sudan and Somalia must be understood. It must also be 
realized that neither country has witnessed any semblance of peace for decades. This will 
be followed by Chapter III, which will analyze the factors that led to the conflict. Chapter 
IV will analyze and critique the attempts by different stakeholders in resolving this 
conflict as well as exploring prospects for reconciliation and peace building between the 
two states. Chapter V will highlight what needs to be taken into consideration in order for 
trust to take root in this region. Recognizing that reconciliation alone will not bring 
peace, measures for economic development, poverty alleviation, and provision of 
alternative means of livelihood need to be considered. Finally, Chapter VI will provide 
conclusions, recommendations and lessons learnt as the international community labors 
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II. HISTORICAL REVIEW OF AREA UNDER STUDY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Ethiopia and Eritrea are distinct nation-states with four common ethnic tribes—
Afar, Saho, Tigrinya, and Kunama—with populations that straddle their common borders 
(Figure 3).35 Eritrea joined a federal union with Ethiopia in 1950 following a UN 
resolution. The dissolution of this federation marked the beginning of Eritrea’s struggle 
for independence which was finally achieved through the cooperation of secessionist 
movements, the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF),36 and the Tigrayan People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF). Historically, the region had been influenced by outside players. 
B. ITALIAN OCCUPATION  
Ethiopia is among the world’s most ancient civilizations ranked along with China, 
Egypt and Persia. The country is famed for its Axumite Empire that was organized by the 
first century AD as a respected trading center.37 According to the Persian prophet, Mani 
(216–276 A.D), “There are four great kingdoms on earth: The first is the Kingdom of 
Babylon [Mesopotamia] and Persia. The second is the Kingdom of Rome; the third is the 
Kingdom of the Axumites, and the fourth is the Kingdom of the Chinese.”38 At its zenith, 
Axum was the most powerful state between the Roman Empire and Persia. It controlled 
large parts today’s highland Eritrea and the Arabian coastline across the Red Sea.39 Save 
for the five years of Italian occupation from 1936 to 1941, Ethiopia maintained its 
independence. However, the major European powers—Britain, France and Italy—never  
 
                                                 
35 Tekeste Negash and Kjetil Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War 
(Athens: Ohio University Press, 2000), 16. 
36 EPLF helped TPLF to defeat the “brutal” regime in Addis, in exchange of which they agreed Eritrea 
would secede.  
37 Bahru Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia 1855–1991 (Addis Ababa: Addis Ababa University 
Press, 2001), 8. 
38 Kobishchanov  M. Juri, Axum (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1979), 51–59. 
39 Zewde, A History of Modern Ethiopia, 8. 
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reconciled themselves with Ethiopia’s independence because the Tripartite Treaty signed 
on December 13, 1906 partitioning Ethiopia into their spheres of influence has not been 
abrogated.40 
Ethiopia’s political landscape is dominated by three main ethnic groups – the 
Oromo, the Amhara and the Tigray. The Oromo are the largest ethnic group occupying 
the central and southern parts of the country. However, much of their land has been taken 
by the northern ethnic groups, the Amhara and Afar, and as a group, they remain 
marginalized.41 The Amhara are the second largest group occupying the central and 
northwestern part of the country. The pre-1991 ruling elites of modern Ethiopia came 
from this ethnic group. As Christopher Clapham asserted in 1960, about three quarters of 
senior government officials in Ethiopia were from this region.42 The Tigray ethnic group 
is the smallest of the three major ethnic groups and constitutes less than ten percent of the 
country’s total population. Although the Tigray were at the centre of the Axumite 
Empire, with the exception of a brief reign of Emperor Yohannes IV’s rule (1872-1889), 
the region remained marginalized during the era of the modern Ethiopian state. However, 
following the collapse of the Derg in 1991, the TPLF has dominated Ethiopian politics to 
date. The TPLF has forged a coalition with the Oromo Peoples’ Democratic Organization 
(OPDO) and the Amhara National Democratic Movement (ANDM) creating a 
“semblance” of a multi-ethnic national party, the Eritrean People Revolutionary 
Democratic Front (EPRDF). The TPLF expanded its national outreach by sponsoring 
satellite ethnic-based parties including those from within the governing coalition. This is 
TPLF’s strategy of controlling power rather than advancing ethnic equality and genuine 
decentralization.43   
                                                 
40 E. Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty. Vol. II (New York: Frank Cass & Co, 1967), 422–423.  
41 Kidane Mengisteab and Okbazghi Yohannes, Anatomy of an African Tragedy: Political, Economic 
and Foreign Policy Crisis in Post-Independent Eritrea, 246. 
42 Ibid. 
43 John W. Harbeson, Elections and Democratization in Post-Mengistu Ethiopia (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1998), 111–131.  
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Eritrea, on the other hand, became a political entity in 1890.44 Eritrea is composed 
of seven main ethnic groups, Tigre, Beni Amer, Bilen, Saho, Baria, Kunama, and Afar 
(Figure 3).45 The central highlands of Eritrea were part and parcel of the Axumite 
civilization of Ethiopia. The main inhabitants of these highlands were the Tigrinya46 
speakers who trace their culture, religion and language to the kingdom of Axum.47 The 
western part of Eritrea is inhabited by the Kunama tribe which also straddles the 
Ethiopian border. The eastern and the coastal parts are inhabited by the Afars who have 
lived independently and, at times, resisted attempts at subjugation by Christian Ethiopian 
highlanders.48 In 1890, Italy combined all these separate tribal groups to establish the 
state of Eritrea as their first colony in Africa, and named it after the Latin name for the 
Red Sea - Erythraeum Mare. 
                                                 
44 Daniel Kendie, The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941–2004: Deciphering the Geo-
political Puzzle (Signature Book Printing, Inc. 2005). 2. 
45 They speak different languages, possess different religions and are conscious of their separate 
identities. 
46 The people from Tigray region are called by the Amharic speakers in Ethiopia Tigre, and Tigrayans 
for plural. Their language is called Tigrinya. Those Tigrinya speakers who come from the Eritrea side will 
simply be referred to as Eritreans in this thesis.   
47 Siegfried Pausewang and Astir Shurke (Ed). The Referendum on Independence for Eritrea (Report 
of the Norwegian observer Group in UNOVER. Human Rights Report No. 2. Oslo, (1993), 5. 
48 Tekeste Negash, Eritrea and Ethiopia: The Federal Experience (Newbrunswick, NJ: Transaction 









Figure 3.   Ethnic Map of Eritrea49 
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Eritrea, in the Italian colonial framework, served many purposes. The seaports of 
Assab and Massawa were used as conduits for export and import trade with northern 
Ethiopia. While in Eritrea, the Italians extended their influence into Ethiopia and used 
Eritrea’s strategic location as a command post to launch its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935; 
it subsequently became Rome’s main economic and communications center south of 
Suez.  The temperate highlands of Eritrea were used to settle landless Italian peasants 
from southern Italy. Eritrea also served as a source of soldiers for further Italian colonial 
adventures in Libya and Ethiopia. The “pacification” of Somalia, by Italy was executed 
by Eritrean soldiers.50 In order to facilitate military mobility for the conquest of Ethiopia, 
Italians invested heavily in Eritrea’s communications infrastructure.51 They built a vast 
network of all-weather roads totaling 1,176 kilometers;52 the 354 kilometer- long 
Massawa-Asmara-Agorat railway,53 and also expanded the ports.54 Military installations, 
depots, workshops, warehouses, shops, villas and flats were rapidly built between 1935 
and 1941. Modern airports were built in Asmara and Gura.55 Eritrea became the main 
military depot as well as the communication and financial center of the Italian East 
African Empire. As shown in Table 1, Eritrea had more commercial and industrial firms 
than other provinces of the Italian Empire combined.   
Following the heavy Italian investments in Eritrea, a distinct Eritrean identity 
based on the growing gap between the socio-economic   realities of Eritrea and Ethiopia 
emerged. This identity was further reinforced by the Italian propaganda that the Italian 
rule had “civilized” the Eritreans and that Ethiopians were backward and therefore in 
                                                 
50 Negash and Tronvoll, Brothers at War: Making Sense of the Eritrean-Ethiopian War, 7–8. 
51 Trevaskis G. N. K., Eritrea: A Colony in Transition, 1941–52 (London: Oxford University Press, 
1960), 55. 
52 Stephen Longrigg, A Short History of Eritrea (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1945), 135. 
53 Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941(Uppsala: Uppsala University Press, 
1987), 42. 
54 Ibid, 40. 
55 Richard Sherman, Eritrea, the Unfinished Revolution (New York: Praeger, 1980), 15. 
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need of an “Italian civilizing mission”56 The Italian cooptation of Eritreans in the 
pacification of the Ethiopian empire further promoted the growth of this identity.  
Apart from creating an Eritrean identity, during their rule the Italians encouraged 
racial divisions. In June 1937, an Italian decree made marriage between Eritreans and 
Italians an indictable offence.57 Alazar Tesfa Michael, a prominent Eritrean journalist of 
the time, aptly described Italian racist policies as follows: “For fifty years of grief and 
pain we were forced to bear the yoke. We were forced to fight for the Italians in Ethiopia, 
Libya and Somaliland. In public buses, Eritrean passengers were never allowed to sit 
with Italians. In Eritrean hospitals, rooms were reserved for Italians. Eritreans were never 
permitted to use them even if they had money.”58    
C. THE BRITISH OCCUPATION  
In 1941, the Italians were defeated by joint British imperial, French, and 
Ethiopian forces and Eritrea fell under the British Military Administration (BMA). The 
British occupied Eritrea and controlled it for the next eleven years for two main reasons - 
as a springboard for military operations against the axis powers and to create a strong 
British sphere of influence in Northeast Africa.59 To achieve their war objectives, the 
British preferred to maintain the status quo [Italian system of administration] in order to 
reduce expenses and save on manpower.  
The British saw Eritrea as an unviable state due to its poor natural resource base 
and geo-politically divided ethnic groups. Ernest Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary at 
the time, described Eritrea as, “an artificial entity which cannot stand by itself.”60 Thus, 
its existence became uncertain and debates about its future occurred both within Eritrea 
                                                 
56 Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941: Policies, Praxis and Impact (Uppsala: 
Uppsala University Press, 1987), 154–157. 
57 Russell Warren Howe, Black Africa from the Colonial Era to Modern Times (New York, 1966), 
139–140. Despite the racial laws which forbade conjugal union between Italians and natives, in 1941 alone, 
there were 25,000 half-castes in Eritrea.  
58 Alazar Tesfa Michael, “Eritrea Today,” The Ethiopian Herald 19 August 1946.  
59 Kendie, The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941–2004: Deciphering the Geo-political 
Puzzle, 58. 
60 As quoted by the Ethiopian Herald, 16 August 1948. Ernest Bevin (1881–1951) was a prominent 
British trade union leader who was Minister of Labor in World War II and Foreign Minister in 1945–51. 
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and the region. Inside Eritrea, the British liberalized the press and allowed the 
establishment of political parties which began to participate in the debate.61 These 
political parties were largely organized along religious and ethnic lines.  For instance, the 
Muslim League (ML) advocated for complete liberation and independence of the serfs of 
western and northern Eritrea, while the Unionist Party largely composed of Christian 
highlanders advocated for union with Ethiopia. The Liberal Progressive Party comprising 
the Tigrinya speaking population from both sides wanted the establishment of an 
independent Tigrayan state.62 
In 1947, a Four Power Commission of Investigation (FPCI) composed of the 
allied powers, the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain and France, visited Eritrea. 
Their subsequent   report, issued in May 1948, was inconclusive because the parties were 
unable to reach agreement on the status of Eritrea.63 As a result, the fate of Eritrea was 
handed over to the United Nations—the newly created body—which subsequently 
dispatched a five-country commission to assess the situation. Like the FPIC, this 
commission, composed of Burma, Guatemala, Norway, Pakistan and South Africa, also 
failed to reach a consensus.64 In 1950, the UN General Assembly resolved that Eritrea 
should be federated to Ethiopia under the sovereignty of the Ethiopian crown, but with an 
autonomous constitution, flag and parliament.65 This compromise solution to the vexing 
question of independence or unification served to strengthen and legitimize Ethiopia’s 




                                                 
61 D. C. Cumming, “The Disposal of Eritrea,” Middle East Journal, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1953), 18–32. 
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65 UN Resolution 390 A (V). 
66 Ruth Iyobo, The Eritrean struggle for Independence: Dominance, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941–
1993 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 94. 
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Table 1.   Industrial & Commercial Firms in the Italian East African Empire, 194067 
Province Number of industrial firms Number of commercial 
firms 
Eritrea 2,198 2,690 
Somalia 584 659 
Shewa 561 634 
Harar 223 166 
Amara 163 510 
Oromo and Sidama 278 126 
 
D. TERMINATION OF THE ETHIO-ERITREAN FEDERATION 
As mentioned above, the Ethio-Eritrean federation was UN-sponsored and backed 
by Ethiopians. In the words of Bereket Habteselassie, the UN’s guarantee of Eritrean 
autonomy, which was grafted on a feudal system, was “like an antibody imposed on a 
body politic that was not able or willing to receive it.”68 The UN provided Eritrea with a 
liberal constitution that had sufficient provisions to safeguard human rights, fundamental 
freedoms including a system of separation of powers, and checks and balances. In 
contrast, Ethiopia was governed under the 1931 constitution that was largely inspired by 
royal absolutism.69  Time magazine, aptly, if not cynically, described the Ethio-Eritrean 
relationship as “a Swiss federation adapted to an African absolute monarchy.”70  
                                                 
67 Source: Tekeste Negash, Italian Colonialism in Eritrea, 1882–1941: Policies, Praxis and Impact, 
52.  
68 Bereket Habteselassie, Eritrea and the United Nations (Trenton, NJ: Red Sea Press, 1980), 40–41. 
69 Kendie, The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941–2004: Deciphering the Geo-political 
Puzzle, 104. 
70 Krzeczunowicz, G., “The Regime of Assembly in Ethiopia,” Journal of Ethiopian Studies, 1. No.1. 
(Addis Ababa, 1963). 
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The federal arrangement created both legal as well as structural contradictions 
between liberal-oriented Eritrea and absolute monarchical Ethiopia.71 Moreover, 
Ethiopia’s government officials were divided on what “federal status” actually meant. 
While the progressive and enlightened ministers saw the potential of using Eritrea’s 
institutions as a model for a wider federation of Ethiopian provinces, the centralist 
ministers argued that Eritrea’s example would inspire other provinces to demand a 
federal status just like Eritrea with all its democratic institutions. This greater degree of 
liberalization in Eritrea was too risky for Emperor Haile Selassie to tolerate. In 1956, 
press freedom was curtailed, followed by a total ban on political parties and trade union 
movements. Further, the Emperor initiated a series of measures to weaken the federation 
and incorporate Eritrea into Ethiopia. On November 15, 1962, the Eritrean Assembly, 
under strong pressure from Ethiopia, voted for union with Ethiopia, and Eritrea became 
the fourteenth province of Ethiopia.72   
E. EMERGENCE OF SECESSION MOVEMENTS 
The Emperor’s ban on trade unions was a shock to many Eritreans. This began the 
decline of imperial government support by members of Eritrea’s working class, many of 
whom were Christian. Additionally, a backsliding economy and rapidly rising 
unemployment rates alienated the Ethiopian government from support by poor Eritrean 
Christians. As a result, when the Emperor terminated the federal arrangement in 1962, 
many Christian Eritreans, just like their Muslim counterparts, felt that the regime was 
acting against their core interests. 73   
Emergence of armed radical Eritrean opposition movements had preceded the 
termination of the federation in 1962. In 1961, the first armed resistance group to emerge 
                                                 
71 Iyob, The Eritrean struggle for Independence: Dominance, Resistance, Nationalism, 1941–1993, 
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72 Kendie, The Five Dimensions of the Eritrean Conflict, 1941–2004: Deciphering the Geo-political 
Puzzle,105. 
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was the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF)74 in response to the increasing agitation over 
federal violations.75 The front immediately launched a protracted militarily and 
economically debilitating civil war.76 The ELF couched its resistance in Pan Arab terms 
using Islam as a tool of national mobilization. The ELF endeavored to establish 
autonomy independent of Christian Ethiopia.77 Iraq and Syria were main sponsors as they 
sought to keep Eritrea as a player in international Arab politics. Discontent grew between 
the Front and the Christian community of Eritrea. Hence, the ELF ostracized those 
Christians who had joined its cause simply because it was the sole movement with an 
organized political agenda at that time. Friction quickly escalated into low-intensity 
conflict between the Christian and Muslim ELF ranks as well as within officers and high-
ranking ELF commanders. When the ELF army was reorganized into armed groups based 
on regional representation, a distinct Christian army unit emerged, exacerbating internal 
strife that further weakened the Front78 The reorganization also led to the breakaway of 
many predominantly Christian-led groups which later amalgamated and challenged the 
hegemony of the ELF.79 
At the beginning of the 1970s, three new groups had established themselves as 
key actors; the strongest of these was led by Issaias Afewerki. In 1974, Issaias’ militia 
group declared a socialist agenda and branded itself the Eritrean People’s Liberation 
Front (EPLF). The most significant support for the EPLF was centered in the Christian 
highlands. Unlike the ELF, the EPLF purported to be non-sectarian and refused to cloak 
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its political agenda under religiosity. This had the effect of strengthening the EPLF 
movement’s ability to recruit members from the predominantly Muslim lowlands. By the 
late 1970s, the EPLF appeared to be the dominant political party in Eritrea. Due to steady 
growth in EPLF military capability, it entered into fierce competition with the ELF. The 
groups fought each other sporadically through the 1970s, with occasional periods of 
cease-fire and military co-operation. In 1981, through the combined effort of the EPLF 
and the newly established Tigrayan front called the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front 
(TPLF), the ELF was expelled from Eritrea and moved into Sudan.80 Consequently, the 
EPLF became the dominant and leading guerrilla movement in Eritrea. 
F. EPLF-TPLF RELATIONS, 1975–1991  
John Young, who studied the revolution of the TPLF, characterized its 
relationship with the ELPF, as “full of tensions and pragmatism.”81 The TPLF was 
established in 1975 by Tigray students at Addis Ababa University. The EPLF provided 
military training and supplies to the first TPLF fighters. This new relationship between 
the two fronts soon became strained, especially when the EPLF entered a new alliance 
with the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Party (EPRP).82 Conversely, the TPLF opened 
relations with the ELF and, as the EPLF-TPLF alliance became more strained, TPLF-
ELF relation improved. These overlapping relations put TPLF and ELF in a dilemma 
throughout 1975-1976 until the EPRP was driven out of Tigray.  In 1976, the TPLF 
launched its manifesto which defined the major purpose of its resistance to be the 
establishment of an independent Tigray state.83  The EPLF countered that only Eritrea 
enjoyed a historical legacy that justified the creation of an independent state. The EPLF 
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countered the TLPF manifesto arguing for the need of a more democratic Ethiopia and 
refusing to acknowledge the potential for the TPLF agenda of Tigray statehood.84  
Despite the two fronts being ideologically socialist, they disagreed over Soviet 
policy. At that time, the USSR supported the Derg regime in Ethiopia which was at war 
with both the EPLF and TPLF. The EPLF saw the potential of garnering support from the 
Soviet Union and gaining a strategic ally.  For its part, the TPLF labeled the Soviet Union 
as a “social imperialist” enemy, which along with the Derg was to be resisted.  To 
highlight its discontent, the TPLF renounced Soviet socialism in favor of the more “self-
reliant” Albanian model of socialism.85  
The two fronts also disagreed over military doctrine, political goals, and the 
treatment of prisoners of war (POWs). As far as military tactics was concerned, the EPLF 
adopted conventional trench warfare which entailed holding a position and then 
systematically liberating adjacent areas and defending them from enemy attack. 
Conversely, the TPLF was averse to fixed warfare since it alienated the movement from 
the masses it was supposed to liberate. They also criticized the so-called “war of 
position” as ineffective   in the face of the heavily armed Ethiopian forces. Mobile 
guerilla hit and run tactics were more effective.86 Regarding POWs, for security reasons 
the EPLF not only failed to liberate or exchange its prisoners, it also required them to 
participate in forced labor, working especially in construction and agriculture, as allowed 
by the Geneva Convention. The TPLF did not incorporate POWs into the system of 
laborers, nor did it consider them as threats to internal security. Rather, the TPLF 
educated prisoners on its political agenda, granting them an opportunity to enlist in the 
TPLF army, seek repatriation at home, or move to Sudanese refugee camps.87  
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Despite these distinctions, the armies cooperated pragmatically on several critical 
occasions. For example, the EPLF had provided military training and arms to TPLF 
fighters from the establishment of the TPLF movement. The TPLF gave the EPLF crucial 
military support during its clashes with the ELF in 1981. Moreover, in 1983, TPLF troops 
had a significant role in saving the EPLF from an annihilating attack on its base area 
(Nakfa) mounted by Derg forces during their “Red Star Campaign.”88 The siege by 
Ethiopian government forces would have certainly destroyed the EPLF movement. 
Essentially, the groups’ political differences revolved around whether the right to 
self-determination included the right of secession. The TPLF openly granted the right of 
all tribes and nationalities of Ethiopia to self-determination, short of secession. It argued 
that the self-determination demanded by Tigrayans and Ethiopians should also to apply to 
the Eritrean population. For the TPLF, if Eritrea planned for a democratic future, it 
should thereby permit the right of self-determination and secession for any “nations” 
within its borders. The EPLF, on the other hand, maintained that there should be no 
secession in democracies. It further clarified that although the right to secede might 
extend to oppressed groups, the principle of “democratic unity” should make secession 
unnecessary.89  
Strong debates within TPLF’s leadership about the Front’s alliance with the EPLF 
continued into the late 1980s. In 1985, the TPLF labeled the EPLF as “undemocratic,” 
refusing to consider secession and defining its partnership with EPLF as one that was 
distinctly “tactical.” It withdrew its support and manpower from Eritrea. The TPLF 
sponsored competing movements in Eritrea, namely the Democratic Marxist League 
(DML) of Eritrea. The EPLF, in turn, responded by eliminating most cooperative efforts 
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the TPLF the worst blow during the serious famine of Tigray (1984–1985) by blocking 
the Sudan-Tigray route. This blockade rendered it impossible for TPLF to deliver 
emergency food aid to the people of Tigray.90  
Overlapping periods of tensions between the two fronts continued until 1988. 
Nonetheless, by 1988, the fronts had won important victories both in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. For example, the TPLF was able to control most of Tigray while the EPLF had 
won the battle of Afabe and in the process captured significant arms from the Ethiopian 
government’s forces. Inspired by their victories and the weakening of the military regime 
in Addis Ababa, the fronts realized that their cooperation was invaluable in defeating the 
Derg. In April 1988, following four days of negotiations in Khartoum, the two fronts 
reestablished a military alliance which finally decimated the Derg in 1991. 
G. INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS 
1. The United States 
 Ethiopian-American relations officially began with the signing of the Treaty of 
Commerce of December 27, 1903, and with personal interest of President Theodore 
Roosevelt in the Skinner Mission to Ethiopia. By 1927, American interests had expanded 
to include mica concessions, petroleum exploration concessions, health and education.91 
On August 29, 1935, the African Exploration and Development Corporation was awarded 
a 75-year concession covering nearly half of Ethiopia to explore, prospect, drill and 
extract both oil and natural gas. However, for security reasons, the U.S. State Department 
cancelled these agreements and requested its citizens to evacuate Ethiopia. Consequently, 
the U.S did not participate in Ethiopia’s struggle with the Italians that took place between 
1935 to 1941.92 
 During the Eisenhower administration, the United States cooperated with Ethiopia 
for political and strategic reasons. Politically, the United States used Ethiopia to fight its 
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war with Russia in Somalia. This was the strategy of “Politica Sciana.”93 During debates 
on Eritrea’s federation to Ethiopia, the U.S. argued against an independent Eritrea on 
grounds that it would be a “weak state exposed to Soviet aggression and infiltration.”94  
In addition, Ethiopia’s geo-strategic location offered a perfect communication 
site, Radio Marina - renamed “Kagnew Station,” – which had the capacity to transmit and 
receive radio signals from Washington, the Middle East, Europe, North Africa, and the 
Pacific. It also served as a listening post on all transmissions in the Middle East and 
Africa.95 In 1952, the United States and Ethiopia signed a defense pact that included a 
25-year lease of Kagnew. In return, Washington granted Ethiopia military assistance and 
training.96 By virtue of the communication station, Ethiopia became part of the “Southern 
Tier”97 line of defense against communism and its contribution to the West in the Cold 
War was considered essential.  
 The United States took strong interest in Ethiopia and therefore granted it both 
development aid and military assistance from 1952 to197698 with the aim of changing 
Ethiopia into a pro-Western state, mitigating the Soviet Union’s economic initiatives 
while  fostering the moderate evolution of the society by improving living conditions and 
increasing consumption levels. However, during this “honeymoon” period, Ethiopian-
U.S. relations became strained when Washington declined to arm and modernize the 
Ethiopian Army, which forced Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie to play his “Soviet 
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card.” Although Haile Selassie had once described the USSR “as the world’s greatest 
power,” he had also tried to maintain good relations with both East and West.99 In 1960, 
when Ethiopia dared to turn to Moscow, Washington revised its stand and agreed to arm 
and train Ethiopia’s military, as well as protect Ethiopia from any aggressors.100 On 
September 13, 1974, the Ethiopian military ousted Emperor Haile Selassie and replaced 
him with Mengistu Haile Mariam. 
2. The Soviet Union 
The Soviet Union’s interests in Ethiopia pre-dated the October Revolution of 
1917. Their historical ties mainly centered on their histories and structures. According to 
Kendie, these early relations emerged from an “assumed” spiritual and confessional 
kinship, and from a perceived need to face a common enemy—the Ottoman Turkish 
state.101  The Russians supported Ethiopian nationalists as a strategy to undermine rival 
European power in the area. In 1895, Russia offered Ethiopia arms and military training 
as well as advice, which facilitated their victory over Italians in the battle of Adowa in 
1896. Russian officers served in the Ethiopian army and even participated in establishing 
the country’s borders. By 1920, Ethiopia had become a sanctuary for Russian 
professionals evacuated from the Crimea by the White Army.102 
 In 1964, Russia supplied arms to both Ethiopia and Somalia during their clashes 
over Ogaden, yet at the same time offered to mediate the conflict.103 During Eritrea’s 
armed struggle in the 1960s, the Soviet Union used its proxies—Syria, China, Cuba, and  
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Egypt—to train and arm the ELF.104 The arms surge in both Eritrea and Somalia 
threatened the existence of Ethiopia. China rescued the country in 1971 by supplying 
arms in order to defeat the ELF insurrection.105 
H. CONCLUSION 
 The evolution of Ethiopia and Eritrea, with Ethiopia being among the oldest 
polities in the world, has been discussed in this chapter. Eritrea came into existence in 
1890 as the first Italian colony in Africa. Eritrea then fell under the British military 
administration from 1941 to 1952 following Italy’s defeat by the allied powers. The 
Italians benefited from Eritrea’s geo-strategic location to further their commercial, 
military and resettlement objectives. They created racial tensions within Eritrea as well as 
a distinct Eritrean identity that separated the Eritreans from Ethiopians. In 1950, the UN 
federated Eritrea to Ethiopia, but granted Eritrea its own liberal constitution that 
guaranteed individual freedoms and rights. This federation was terminated by Emperor 
Haile Selassie in 1962 when Eritrea was annexed as Ethiopia’s fourteenth province. This 
annexation marked the beginning of Eritrea’s armed struggle for independence via 
liberation movements.  
 The main liberation movements, EPLF and TPLF, cooperated to overthrow the 
Derg regime in Addis Ababa in 1991 and formed transitional governments in Eritrea and 
Ethiopia respectively. The tensions and contradictions between the EPLF and TPLF trace 
their origin to their differences in military doctrine, ideology and the need for self-
determination. Despite their cooperation in crucial moments that led to their victories, the 
two fronts continued with tensions even after Eritrea’s independence in 1991. These 
differences came to be exploited when the border and trade disputes arose. These disputes 
will be analyzed in the next chapter.  
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III. THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE WAR 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 Although a border dispute was the immediate cause of the war between Ethiopia 
and Eritrea from 1998 to 2000, there were underlying causes deeply rooted in the two 
countries’ historical backgrounds. As Birger Heldet asserts, “a territorial dispute is 
virtually necessary but not [a] sufficient condition for interstate war.”106  In trying to 
decode the causes of this interstate conflict, this thesis shall utilize Kenneth Waltz’s 
“level of analysis framework” that integrates three levels of analysis—the individual, the 
nation-state (national), and the systemic or international system.107 At the individual 
level, the focus is on human nature and predisposition towards aggression. The national 
level includes the government variables that lead to war. The systemic level explains the 
distribution of power and the international environment. Thus, the causes of the Ethiopia-
Eritrean war will be better understood as an interaction within these three levels both in 
time and space. 
B. INDIVIDUAL LEVEL 
 Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi and Eritrean President Issayas Afeworki 
each played a crucial role in the eruption of the conflict. Both had been successful 
guerrilla leaders of their respective liberation movements, the TPLF and EPLF, but did 
not develop into statesmen after ascending to power. Both regimes have a political 
culture of totalitarian rule where absolute power is taken for granted.108 As Habte 
Selassie notes, “the leadership of both countries is a battle hardened lot in which military 
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expediency dictates the order of things, and the concept of democracy is a rather new 
word in their vocabulary and its practice has yet to see the light of day.”109 
  According to the Horn of Africa Program director, Kjetil Tronvoll, whereas 
Issayas was ambitious and dictatorial, Meles remained weak and soft in handling 
Ethiopian affairs with Eritrea.110 Former U.S President Jimmy Carter, who met Meles 
Zenawi in 1989, remembers: 
When I used to meet Meles during my visits to the region, he would 
spread his war maps on the floor and described his progress against 
Mengistu’s forces. After Meles prevailed in 1991 and despite my concerns 
about the Eritrean leadership, he granted Eritrea complete independence in 
1993, cutting Ethiopia off from the Red Sea and making it the most 
populous landlocked nation in the world.111  
 Meles Zenawi who shares the same ethnic group—Tigrinya—as Issayas 
Afeworki, has been criticized by the independent media for sacrificing Ethiopia’s 
economic interests to the point that he was derisively nicknamed: “Eritrea’s Ambassador 
to Ethiopia.”112 Ethiopia’s opposition press once noted: “Prime Minister Meles Zenawi 
has played a key role in the secession of Eritrea. The prime minister’s mother voted in 
public in the referendum for secession. As things stand, we are facing war with Eritrea. 
Ato Meles can apologize to the Ethiopian people and/or restore our natural seaport. Then 
can he expect forgiveness.”113 In a 1999 interview, Meles indicated that he was 
optimistic that Eritrea would federate with Ethiopia, although the basis of his “optimism” 
is unclear.114 
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 As in Ethiopia, the power of the Eritrean president is unencumbered by regulatory 
mechanisms or civilian advisors,115 which allows President Afeworki to make unilateral 
decisions. His only trusted political allies were generals upon whom he relied for 
advice.116 Indeed, the border issue had featured in discussions between 1993 to 1997 and 
remained unresolved. Territorial dispute was just an excuse for rather than the cause of 
Isaayas’ decision to go to war with Ethiopia. The mobilization of the Eritrean army on 
May 12, 1998, in response to clashes at the border village of Badme, on presidential 
orders without consulting any political party, parliament, or the cabinet, attest to the 
centralized nature of Eritrea’s decision making. Despite Issayas’ reputation for “keeping 
his head in a crisis,”117 this decision proved to be a miscalculation that showcased his 
failure to anticipate that Ethiopians would put aside their differences in the face of an 
Eritrean threat, as they had against the Italians in 1896 and the Somalis in 1977, rather 
than fragment into ethnic camps.118 Moreover, Issayas believed that war would bolster 
his political power in Eritrea as well as bring a regime change in Addis Ababa that would 
force Ethiopia to shelve its ambitious industrialization program and revert to the free 
trade agreement.119  
C. NATIONAL LEVEL 
1. Nation-State Building in Eritrea 
 In newly created states, crash programs of state and nation-building when pursued 
simultaneously can pose challenges that may tempt leadership to resort to coercive 
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measures.120 Soon after independence in 1991, the Eritrean government declared its 
development vision—to become the next Singapore by 2015—by maintaining an open 
economy with service and export orientation.121According to the President of Addis 
Ababa University, Eshete Endreas, Eritrea’s desire to realize this vision was the main 
cause of the border conflict with Ethiopia.122 Eritrea aspired to become the hegemony in 
the Horn of Africa and a “big player” in the international arena. To support this vision, 
Eritrea sought to forge a national identity through military adventures against all its 
relatively weak neighbors—Yemen, Djibouti and Sudan. Eritrea clashed with Sudan over 
Islamic militants as well as with both Yemen and Djibouti over territory.123 Ultimately, 
Eritrea picked a quarrel with what it perceived to be a weak and divided Ethiopia in order 
to bolster its regional position.  
2. Diversionary War 
States, when faced with domestic crises, resort to scapegoating to divert public 
attention. According to U.S. political scientists Clifton Morgan and Kenneth Bickers, 
state leaders adopt diversionary tactics when faced with the loss of support from social 
groups that form the main constituent in the ruling coalition.124 In early 1998, there was a 
political revolt within TPLF ranks against Meles Zenawis’ rule after opposition political 
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reacted by consolidating his power within Ethiopia. When local clashes started in Badme, 
Meles seized the opportunity to overwhelm the opposition by posing as “a champion of 
Tigray.”126 
Unlike other African states approaching independence, Eritrea did not receive any 
preparation for statehood in the form of a legacy from a colonizing power. Instead, 
Eritrea’s statehood came at the end of a bitter thirty-year liberation struggle with an 
Ethiopian regime that had neglected its development. Nor was its development helped by 
an international economic recession and a prolonged drought.127 In the intervening years, 
the TPLF and EPLF did not take adequate steps to address the basic needs and aspirations 
of their people. According to Milikias Paulos, a professor of Humanities and Political 
Science at Marian Polis College, internal economic pressures drove the two states into 
war to avoid public criticism.128  
3. Public Perception 
As already discussed, the EPLF was involved in the training of the TPLF at its 
early stages, and tended to treat the front as its “junior partner.” This caused Ethiopian 
Tigrayans to feel patronized by Eritreans, especially when they recall having taken low-
paying jobs in Eritrea as casual laborers, domestic servants, woodcutters, potters, 
housemaids, waitresses, and even as prostitutes. Eritreans denigrated these Tigrayans as 
agame—a term used to describe uncouth peasants. Conversely, Eritreans took up skilled 
jobs in Ethiopia and invested heavily in businesses. According to BBC correspondent 
Martin Plaut, class cleavages, privilege, snobbery and envy all served to fuel animosities 
between the former allies.129     
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4. Economic Tensions 
Oh, nakfa you are an indefatigable grave digger 
First for the enemy 
And now the defender, 
The instability you suffer I did hear 
But your stolidity in your children that you now bear 
I dare say but that you are a double dealer.130 
 Many Ethiopians believe that economics lies at the core of the conflict.131 
According to Patrick Gilkes and Martin Plaut, economic issues were crucial to both the 
origins and development of this conflict.132 Economic controversies were the only 
publicly declared differences between the two states prior to the war.   When Eritrea 
seceded from Ethiopia in 1991, Ethiopian currency—the bir—continued to be used as the 
de facto currency within the two states. In 1992, Assab was established as a free port for 
Ethiopia through the Transit Trade Agreement.133 By September 27, 1993, a total of 
twenty-five protocols, branded the Asmara Pact, had been signed by the two states, which 
included among other things a joint defense pact, agreements on harmonization of 
monetary and fiscal policies, and the establishment of a free trade area.134 However, 
these agreements lacked details on some crucial issues, including the citizenship of 
Ethiopians in Eritrea and Eritreans in Ethiopia, the mode of payment in trade 
transactions, and the disposal of the bir in circulation in Eritrea once Eritrea adopted its 
own currency. Despite inherent shortcomings in these agreements and lack of pragmatic 
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implementation by both states, this cooperation135 enabled them to revitalize their 
respective economies and register considerable progress in the short term as depicted in 
Figure 5. Between 1993 and 1996, over 60 percent of Eritrea’s exports went to 
Ethiopia.136 Additionally, Eritrea earned about 150 million bir annually from dues and 
port charges.137 
Table 2.   Eritrea’s Trade with Ethiopia (in bir)138 
Year Imports Exports Balance 
1993 63,968,197 123,579,747 59,611,550 
1994 90,796,808 181,491,011 90,694,203 
1995 146,820,200 259,700,000 112,880,000 
1996 261,781,354 273,400,000 11,618,646 
1997 274,600,000 218,200,000 -56,400,000 
 
 As previously discussed, Eritrea adopted a service and export oriented model of 
economic development that would propel it into a regional centre of financial services 
akin to that of Singapore. Ethiopia, on the other hand, adopted import substitution 
industrialization (ISI). The economic harmonization pacts between Ethiopia and Eritrea 
had envisaged the idea of specialization in which Eritrea would be the industrial 
powerhouse and use its ports to become an import and export zone, while Ethiopia would 
be the agricultural supplier.139  
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 Between 1993 and 1996, contrary to the economic accord of the Asmara Pact, 
Ethiopia changed its development strategy and decided to develop its industrial base, 
with most industries concentrated in the Tigray region. These industries were similar to 
those in Eritrea and had the capacity to meet local demands and export the surplus to 
other parts of the country.140 To protect its nascent industries, Ethiopia adopted a 
protectionist policy by imposing indirect taxes, embarkation charges and development 
fees on all Eritrean goods entering the Tigray region (Kelil),141 making Eritrean goods 
less competitive in the Ethiopian market. This created unfavorable terms of trade for 
Eritrea since Ethiopian goods were allowed to enter freely into Eritrean markets and not 
subject to any taxes.  
 In early 1997, Asmara forwarded a series of proposals to Addis Ababa including a 
phased introduction of its own currency, the nakfa, beginning in July, allowing both 
currencies to circulate on either side of the border and retaining a 1:1 bir/nakfa parity and 
periodic settlement of imbalances using dollars. Ethiopia flatly rejected these proposals 
and stated that it would not accept parity of the two currencies due to the different 
economic policies pursued by the two states (Eritrea favored a free market policy while 
Ethiopia pursed a closed market policy).142 Ethiopia’s monetary policy, coupled with the 
new shift into industrialization became a threat to Eritrea’s economy. Economic tensions 
spiraled when Eritrea issued its new currency on November 1, 1997. By late 1997, both 
states began imposing unilateral economic policies that further strained their relationship. 
Ethiopia demanded that its trade relations with Eritrea be henceforth formalized, and all 
cross border transactions (less petty exchanges valued less than 2,000 bir or U.S $250) be 
undertaken using hard currency (U.S. dollars) and letters of credit (L/C). Additionally, 
Ethiopia issued its new bir notes illustrated with a tiny inset map of Ethiopia that 
incorporated the disputed border (Figure 4)143 with the aim of preventing the 
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recirculation into Ethiopia’s economy of all bir redeemed for nakfa in Eritrea.144 Due to 
foreign currency restrictions and increased competition from subsidized factories in 
Tigray, demand for Eritrean industrial goods in Ethiopia plummeted. In retaliation for 
Ethiopia’s revised economic arrangement, Eritrea imposed heavy levies on all products 
imported and exported by Ethiopia through its ports.145 
 It can be argued that prior to the outbreak of war in May 1998; each state pursued 
a protectionist policy to shield its interests, policies that endangered Eritrea’s state-
building project. Eritrea’s vulnerability to Ethiopia’s economic policy shifts was a factor 
that persuaded Afewerki to use force.  According to Franklin Steves, Eritrean 
industrialists pressured Afewerki to protect their interests.146 According to this 
interpretation, that Eritrean air strikes were directed against industries in Tigray as war 
intensified in June 1998 is hardly a coincidence. As Lara Santoro aptly put it, “it was 
clear what they (the Eritreans) were up to: they wanted to wipe out the competition.”147   
 
Figure 4.   Outline of “enlarged” Ethiopia on a 100 bir note (1997)148 
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5. Political Tensions/Ethnicity 
After the fall of the Derg, Ethiopia and Eritrea followed different political paths. 
For fear of ethnic conflicts within the country, Ethiopia adopted a decentralized federal 
system based on ethnic federalism in an attempt to diffuse potential ethnic conflict. The 
constitution enacted in 1995 stipulated the autonomy of ethnic regions, up to and 
including the right to secede. The TPLF believed that devolution of power would insure 
unity in Ethiopia.149 However, shortly after 1991, the TPFL (being the ruling party) took 
the decision to marginalize other members of the EPRDF coalition. The marginalized 
parties have radicalized, challenging Meles to take a more militant policy on the border 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea.150 Conversely, Eritrea pursued a unitary state system in 
which ethnic identities have no independent political voice. The Eritrean constitution 
outlawed religious or ethnic based parties.151    
6. Nature of the Regimes 
According to the democratic peace theory, democratic states rarely go to war with 
one another. On the other hand, transitional democracies tend to be more war-prone as 
compared to either established democracies or stable non-democratic states.152 Within a 
transition period, the likelihood of interstate war increases as the political leaders 
manipulate and mobilize national support to shore up their domestic political standing in 
the absence of strong political institutions.  
Both the TPLF and EPLF formed transitional governments (after the fall of the 
Derg) in Addis Ababa and Asmara respectively and claimed commitment to democratic 
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reforms.153 However, during the 1990s, these claims of genuine democracy became lip-
service as the regimes relapsed into classic autocracies. As Jon Abbink posits, “the 
governments in Ethiopia and Eritrea have shown indifference towards the spirit and 
institutions of democracy, dialogue and impartial justice, in favor (sic) of political control 
and regime stability.”154 Eritrea has witnessed gross human rights violation, press 
censorship; government critics have been jailed, and the state institutions are 
subordinated to the whims of the president.155 A former EPLF supporter, Dan Connell, 
laments: “During the decade since independence, the president and his close allies have 
squeezed the ‘liberty’ out of liberation and left only the seductive shell of a top-down 
egalitarian development project.”156 In Ethiopia, political parties are repressed, human 
and civil rights are violated, and national election irregularities have continued unabated 
since 1992.157 According to Connell, the use of state coercion against domestic 
challenges coupled by extreme political flux led the two states into war.158  
D. INTERNATIONAL LEVEL 
 At the international level, attention is focused on the colonial legacy and how it 
contributed to war, as well as how major powers influenced both war and peace.  Eritrea 
as a state was created as an Italian colony in 1890. The Italians invested heavily in Eritrea 
and imparted a distinct Eritrean identity tied to better socio-economic conditions. 
Eritreans developed a sense of being “civilized” and regarded Ethiopians as 
“backward.”159 In one interview, Eritrean President Issayas once said, “We have lived 
with Europeans; we have seen much of the civilized world. There are many things we 
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have learned from them. The Ethiopians, on the contrary, have just come out of the 
forest. They are not civilized. They feel inferior because they have come out of the 
bush.”160 Eritrea also raised several claims including unilaterally overthrowing the Derg, 
defeating Ethiopia despite Addis Ababa having received support from the U.S and 
Russia, and outwitting the superpowers. This glorified self-image was used to build a 
new national identity anchored in the belief that “Eritreans could overcome 
insurmountable obstacles.” According to Leencho Lata, this new identity fomented by 
Eritrean leadership was instrumental in convincing Eritreans that they could prevail in a 
conflict with their neighbor.161 
 The absence of an overarching governing structure within the international system 
provides conditions for war to occur. However, with the existence of a unipolar system, 
power is concentrated in the leading state which makes the system more peaceful.162  
According to hegemonic stability theory, the dominant power creates regimes with 
defined norms, rules, procedures and organizing principles that guide the actions of 
states, and from which all states that adhere to the regime benefit.163 Hegemony may 
create peace and security within the system to serve a state’s own self-interests, or remain 
either partially or fully disengaged from preventing or solving a conflict within the 
system when that state’s interests are not jeopardized. 
 Following the end of the Cold War, abortive interventions in Lebanon (1980s) 
and Somalia (1993), and the Rwandan genocide (1994), the U.S deescalated its security 
and development commitments to Africa. In March and April 1998, former President Bill 
Clinton visited Africa and expressed America’s support for the betterment of Africa, but  
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this was backed by neither strategic nor financial commitment.164 However, when the 
Ethio-Eritrean war broke out in 1998, the United States immediately intervened, although 
without great effect.  
In the early 1990s, the United States increased financial assistance to the new 
regimes in Ethiopia and Eritrea in order to stabilize the region. Between 1991 and 1994, 
aid to Ethiopia rose from $57 million to $168 million and thereafter plummeted by fifty 
percent by 1997. In the case of Eritrea,165 the total aid amounted to $28 million in 1994 
and declined to $17 million in 1997.166 This decline in aid lowered the Clinton 
Administrations’ effectiveness in influencing behavior before the 1998 war. The partial 
disengagement of the United States incentivized Russia, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania, 
China and North Korea to sell arms to both Ethiopia and Eritrea, both before and during 
the war.167 Moreover, for fear of radicalizing the combatants, Washington allowed the 
World Bank to grant aid to both countries throughout the war.168 However, with good 
intentions, prior to the war, the U.S provided military aid in form of communication 
equipment and transport aircraft to both Ethiopia and Eritrea for containment of the 
National Islamic Front government in Sudan.169 It is therefore clear that the failure of the 
United States to effectively resolve the conflict coupled by its selective policy choices 
were permissive causes of the war.   
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 The root causes of the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict are varied and can be better 
understood through the three levels of analysis—individual, state and systemic levels. At 
the individual level, emphasis is placed on how human nature predisposed individual 
actors to opt for war. At the state level, the absence of a democratic culture, long-standing 
ethnic, religious and social differences, and conflicting economic policies impelled both 
governments toward conflict. Both Meles Zenawi and Issayas Afeworki were successful 
guerilla leaders who inherited dilapidated infrastructures on assuming leadership in their 
respective countries and did not make any deliberate effort to improve them. Although 
they adopted diametrically opposite systems of government, with Ethiopia embracing an 
ethnic based, federal structure and Eritrea pursuing a unitary system, they are/were both 
autocratic and continue to suppress domestic challenges and manipulate the populace for 
their own self interests. The two states used warfare as an instrument of state and nation 
building. Economically, each state adopted a divergent model of economic development. 
Eritrea pursued a free market export oriented economy while Ethiopia adopted an 
agricultural based closed economy. These different models came to “haunt” them when 
they created different exchange rates for the same currency leading to further economic 
tensions. 
 At the international level, the major powers, the United States and the USSR, 
contributed to the war. The U.S played an insignificant role in restraining the former 
allies from resorting to war although it took a mediator’s role once hostilities erupted. 











IV. CONFLICT RESOLUTION ATTEMPTS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to 
govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would 
be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by 
men over men, the great difficulty is this: You must first enable the 
government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to 
control itself.170 
Barely a week after the first border clashes between Ethiopia and Eritrea at 
Badme on May 6, 1998, both regional and international actors offered to mediate the 
dispute. The United States’ rapid diplomatic response team led by Susan Rice, U.S. 
Assistant Secretary of State, worked closely with Paul Kagame, then vice president of 
Rwanda,171 and established a four-point peace formula on June 3, 1998 to enhance a 
peaceful and durable resolution of the war. This peace proposal was accepted by 
Ethiopia, but not by Eritrea.172 The Organization of African Unity (OAU) then took over 
stewardship of mediation efforts, further developing the four-point proposals into a 
Framework Agreement. Again, Ethiopia accepted it while Eritrea refused  
A breakthrough came on June 18, 2000 in Algeria, when both parties signed an 
agreement committing themselves into the immediate cessation of hostilities. The parties 
requested UN assistance with the implementation of ceasefire, which resulted in the 
establishment of the UNMEE by the Security Council in July 2000. Further negotiations 
between Ethiopia and Eritrea continued in Algiers resulting in a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement (CPA) signed on December 12, 2000.  
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Ten years after the historic signing of the Algiers Agreement, the conflict remains 
unresolved. This chapter will analyze why the efforts of multiple actors to advance 
implementation have failed, resulting in continuing deadlock.  
B. THE U.S-RWANDA PEACE PLAN 
 The U.S-Rwanda team was the first to broker the conflict with a view to ending 
hostilities and obtaining a lasting peaceful settlement. Having established points of 
convergence between parties, the team recommended: 
• The need for both parties to commit themselves to settling this conflict and 
any other via peaceful means while renouncing the use of force to impose 
solutions.  
• The need for reduction of hostilities, deployment of observers at Badme to 
safeguard territorial claims of either party, redeployment of Eritrean forces 
from Badme to areas held prior to May 6, 1998, and a return to normalcy 
in Badme. 
• The need for both parties to agree on a final, binding delimitation and 
demarcation of the common border on basis of existing colonial treaties 
and applicable international law using qualified personnel.  
•   The need for the demilitarization of the border by both parties.173 
 A day after the plan was made public, Meles Zenawi, in a public address, 
accepted the peace proposals in total as the cornerstone the peaceful resolution of the 
crisis.174 Eritrea, on the other hand, skeptical of Ethiopia’s commitment to peaceful 
settlement, declined to endorse them, maintaining that the facilitators ought to have come 
up with a more comprehensive plan with sufficient details and an implementation 
framework. Eritrea further stated that, “while the facilitation process has gone a long way 
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in creating grounds for a non-violent and legal solution, the Government of Ethiopia, 
which has stated its acceptance of the recommendations, is still bent on an all-out 
war.”175 Indeed, Eritrea’s reluctance to endorse was justified by a reckless official 
statement issued by Meles on June 4, 1998: 
Although the Ethiopian Government maintains its stand for peace and 
supports the compromise proposal presented by the government of the 
United States and Rwanda even now, the continued aggression of the 
Eritrean Government has exhausted our patience. Therefore, the Defence 
Forces of Ethiopia have been directed to take all necessary measures 
against the repeated aggression of the Eritrean Government and to 
safeguard the territorial integrity of the country….176  
The following day, on June 5, 1998, the Ethiopian air force bombed Asmara 
airport. Eritrea retaliated the same afternoon by bombing a school (sadly, full of students) 
at Mekelle. Because the United States had earlier issued a warning, all embassies in 
Asmara had evacuated their personnel the previous day, which caused the Eritreans to 
claim that Washington had prior knowledge of Ethiopia’s plans. This brought to sharp 
focus, suspicion of Washington’s interests in the dispute and created distrust in the whole 
peace plan. Both Asmara and Addis Ababa saw the fact that the U.S. delegation was led 
by “a relatively young and inexperienced woman” as evidence of their conflicts’ lack of 
importance in the eyes of Washington.177  
Further, the framing of the four point plan seemed to suggest one party was to 
blame for the conflict. Because the United States’ demand that Eritrean troops leave 
Badme (status quo ante bellum) matched that of Ethiopia, Eritrea suspected collusion and 
ceased to see Washington as an “honest broker.” Conversely, Eritrea was opposed to 
abandoning Badme, arguing that cessation of hostilities was sufficient to facilitate 
delimitation and demarcation of the border. It is this disagreement that stymied the U.S.-
Rwanda four-point peace proposals (FPPP) and other follow-on peace initiatives.  
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C. THE ORGANIZATION OF AFRICAN UNITY’S EFFORT 
The Ethiopia-Eritrea conflict was the main agenda of the OAU summit held from 
June 1-10, 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.  A High-Level Delegation (HLD) 
consisting of heads of states from Burkina Faso, Djibouti, Zimbabwe and Rwanda, and 
the OAU chairman, was established to facilitate negotiations between the parties. When 
the HLD visited the parties on June 18–19, 1998, Ethiopia confirmed acceptance of the 
FPPP, but Eritrea maintained that the FPPP was a closed chapter and would treat the 
OAU plan as a new initiative. This initial visit by the HLD was thus a total failure, but an 
Ambassador Committee (AC) was immediately appointed to take over the duties of HLD.  
The mandate of the AC was to investigate and gather intelligence about the 
conflict including the disputed areas. After site visits, the AC submitted a comprehensive 
report to the HLD on August 1–2, 1998. This report formed the basis on which the OAU 
conflict resolution framework was developed.178 The key point of convergence between 
the parties was the modalities for the settlement of the disputed border on basis of 
delimitation and demarcation. Nonetheless, this report did not have any significant 
deviation from FPPP as it endorsed the need for the return of status quo ante bellum. 
During the HLD meeting of November 7–8, 1998, Meles accepted the OAU 
framework for a peaceful resolution of the dispute when he received a clarification 
regarding the withdrawal of Eritrean forces as well as administration of Badme. For his 
part, Issayas insisted on a formal ceasefire agreement so that all parties were “committed 
to the cardinal rule of rejecting use of force in resolving disputes.” In Asmara on 
December 12, 1998, in a meeting with OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim, 
Afeworki presented a statement indicating Eritrea’s hesitation, stressing inter alia that, 
“Indeed, while Eritrea had made it clear that the [U.S.-Rwanda] facilitation process was 
over and it regarded OAU initiative as a new one, the recommendations by the 
Committee of Ambassadors revolved around the same parameters that had led to the  
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failure of the facilitation process.”179 President Afeworki also presented a list of thirty-
one issues that needed clarification by the OAU before Eritrea could endorse the OAU’s 
proposals. 
During the OAU meeting held on December 17, 1998, Meles Zenawi accused 
Eritrea of derailing the peace process and demanded a return of status quo ante bellum. 
Meles also recounted before the members the infamous border clashes Eritrea had had 
with all its neighbors. Afeworki retaliated in a speech to the Central Organ of the OAU 
dismissing Ethiopia’s accusations as hollow and that “Ethiopia’s shrill and offensive 
language is designed to drown the facts in the sea of accusations.”180 President Afeworki 
also expressed his appreciation of the OAU’s commitment to resolving the conflict, but 
elaborated his main areas of disagreement with the OAU’s proposals, most critical being 
withdrawal of troops and a return of civil administration at Badme. He suggested that the 
demarcation of the border would automatically resolve the issue of Badme.181 The 
Central Organ of the OAU noted the sentiments of both parties but unconditionally 
endorsed these proposals as the appropriate framework for resolution of the Ethiopia-
Eritrea conflict.” The parties were further implored to “cooperate with the HLD with a 
view to creating the necessary conditions for the speedy implementation of the 
Framework Agreement.”182  
In short, the negotiations had come to a standstill by the close of 1998, and both 
parties began preparing for full-scale war. In January 1999, the OAU responded to 
Eritrea’s request for clarification, but its response was not acted upon because both 
parties were engaged in mutual recriminations.  
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D. THE UN EFFORT 
The UN involvement began when it adopted the OAU Framework Agreement 
through Security Council resolution 1226 of January 29, 1999. The UN expressed strong 
support for the OAU initiative reaffirming it as the “best hope for peace between the 
parties.”183 This resolution also endorsed the appointment of a UN special envoy to the 
Horn to bolster the OAU peace initiative. Noted also was the fact that Eritrea had 
received clarifications from the OAU and was “strongly urged to accept the Framework 
Agreement as basis for peaceful resolution of the dispute…without delay.”184 Paragraph 
7 of the resolution implored both parties to remain committed to the peace process while 
abstaining from use of military force against each other. 
Eritrea responded the same day in a letter to the President of the Security Council 
affirming that, “Eritrea is fully engaged in the peace process because it understands and 
realizes fully well that the framework is not a ‘take it or leave it’ offer.”185 Eritrea’s 
concern was the procedural details of the negotiation and it emphasized its reluctance to 
endorse the original Framework Agreement. Conversely, Ethiopia accepted the UNSC 
resolution, stressing that “it left no ambiguity with regard to what is expected from 
whom.”186 Ethiopia’s sustained air assault prompted the UNSC to issue another 
resolution, 1227, condemning the use of force and demanding an immediate ceasefire.187 
An arms embargo was placed against both parties.  
Each country reacted immediately to the resolution, blaming the other for the 
breach of the air moratorium. Eritrea exclaimed that the arms embargo would lead to 
regional imbalance.188 On the other hand, Ethiopia blamed Eritrea for initiating the 
bombardment of Ethiopia’s northern town of Adirat on February 5 and stated that it was 
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legally entitled to self-defense.189  This weapons embargo became the turning point of 
Ethiopia’s relations with the international community over dispute settlement.190 Indeed, 
the UN had rekindled [Ethiopia’s] bitter memories of an earlier arms embargo issued by 
the League of Nations in 1936 on both Italy and Ethiopia with full knowledge that Italy, 
the aggressor, was sufficiently equipped, while Ethiopia (the victim) lacked the arms to 
defend its territory.191 Ethiopia felt betrayed by the international community for being 
judged as the aggressor and that it (the United Nations) could therefore not be trusted to 
negotiate for a neutral outcome. The Ethiopian parliament strongly condemned the 
UNSCR for imposing the provocative embargo.192 Ethiopia also criticized the United 
States over the violation of the air moratorium,193 effectively bringing to a halt a parallel 
U.S. facilitation initiative that had all along been working with the OAU, but had kept a 
low profile to allow the OAU to come up with a “home grown” solution. 
On the Eritrean side, a similar cycle of distrust with the OAU had set in. 
Historically, President Issayas had openly denounced the OAU as being corrupt and 
inefficient, and not of any value to the member states. The presence of Djibouti in the 
HLD also lowered the credibility of the team since Eritrea had had border clashes with 
Djibouti in 1996. Djibouti had terminated its diplomatic ties with Eritrea following 
accusations (Eritrea accused Djibouti) of aiding Ethiopia in its war preparation by 
allowing transit of war supplies through its port.194   
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Full scale war erupted following Ethiopia’s air attacks on February 5, 1999, and 
the HLD continued with shuttle diplomacy visiting both capitals attempting to make a 
breakthrough in the peace process. Ethiopia, through its Foreign Minister Seyoum 
Mesfin, reconfirmed its approval of the OAU Framework Agreement and made it 
abundantly clear to the HLD that the hostilities would only be halted when Eritrea 
accepted the agreement.195 Through a sustained three-day offensive code-named 
“Operation Sunset” carried out on February 23-26, 1999 along the Badme-Shiraro front, 
the Ethiopian forces managed to recapture Badme village and its environs. The fall of 
Badme was a big humiliation for Eritrea due to its symbolic value.196 Indeed, even 
Issayas Afeworki had once said that, “expecting Eritrea to withdraw (from Badme) is 
unlikely as the sun never rising again.”197 On February 27, 1999, Asmara announced its 
endorsement of the OAU Framework Agreement and this gesture was immediately 
welcomed by the UN Security Council.198 
During the OAU’s summit held on July 11, 1999 in Algeria, the “Modalities for 
the Implementation” of the Framework Agreement, an invention of the HLD, was 
endorsed. The “Modalities” committed both parties to peaceful resolution of the conflict 
and implementation of the Framework Agreement without coercion.199 When the 
modalities were presented before the parties, Eritrea accepted but requested full 
compensation for the deportees and damaged property.200 Ethiopia on the other hand, did 
not confirm acceptance, but emphasized the ambiguity of Eritrea’s acceptance which had 
created a new dimension of modalities. As aptly stated by Meles, “We cannot accept that 
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modality by emasculating it, gutting the substance out of it, bringing in totally new 
substance and then say we accept it. That is not acceptable. That is rejection. We will not 
engage in such a subterfuge. If we accept the package, your Excellencies, we will not tell 
you so. No ifs, no buts.”201 Sustained negotiation and shuttle diplomacy with Addis 
Ababa led to Ethiopia’s acceptance of the Modalities Agreement on July 20, 1999. Both 
parties were praised by the international community for this new development.202  
E. SPECIAL ENVOY DIPLOMACY 
A joint team comprised of representatives drawn from Algeria, the OAU, the 
U.S.203 and the UN met in Algiers204 and formulated the technical details for the 
implementation of both the Framework Agreement and the Modalities of Ceasefire 
Agreement between warring parties. These technical details provided the roadmap 
through which the Agreements could be implemented without any alterations and were 
final and binding to the two parties. On scrutinizing the documents, Eritrea accepted the 
plan while Ethiopia expressed reservations. The U.S team, led by Tony Lake, in 
collaboration with Ahmed Ouyahia, the Algerian special representative, and Rino Serri, 
the European Union (EU) special envoy spent the next nine months of shuttle diplomacy 
visiting Asmara, Addis Ababa and Algiers in order to bring Ethiopia “on board.”205 In 
April 2000, the joint team met the parties in Algiers where Eritrea presented a list of new 
conditions for deliberation and the negotiations stalled.  
Another round of intensive mediation immediately began in Algiers in May 2000, 
when Ethiopia mounted a major military offensive which overwhelmed several Eritrean 
defense positions along the border. On June 18, 2000, the mediators led by Ouyahia and 
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Lake, finally emerged with an agreement acceptable to both parties [Algiers Agreement 1 
(AA1)] and fighting ceased.206 This Agreement also allowed the deployment of 
peacekeepers to facilitate the implementation of the Agreement. Following a request to 
the UN, the UNSC authorized the establishment of the UNMEE on July 31, 2000.207 In 
August 2000, the Security Council of the UN approved the deployment of UNMEE.208 
The next round of talks led by Tony Lake started in the fall of 2000 concentrated on 
establishing a comprehensive peace agreement that addressed the border delimitation and 
demarcation, compensation for war damages, and investigations of the origins of the 
conflict. After month three of intensive sessions and shuttling between Asmara, Addis 
and Algiers, the Peace Agreement [Algiers Agreement 2 (AA2)] was finally signed by 
President Issayas Afeworki and Prime Minister Meles Zenawi on December 12, 2000.209 
This Agreement addressed the immediate causes of war—by creating a border 
delimitation and demarcation commission; reasons for conflict—establishment of claims 
commission; and proximate effects of the war—establishment of compensation 
commission. 
F. PEACEKEEPING 
 The UNMEE was constituted under Chapter VI of the UN Charter as an observer 
mission to monitor the cessation of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and the 25 
kilometer TSZ separating the parties as indicated in Figure 2. The UNSC authorized the 
deployment of 4,200 military personnel including 220 military observers. In accordance 
with AA1, the UNMEE was mandated to monitor the cessation of hostilities and the 
temporary security zone, chair the military coordination commission (MCC) of the two 
parties, coordinate and provide technical assistance for humanitarian de-mining activities 
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in the TSZ and areas adjacent to it, and coordinate the Mission’s activities with 
humanitarian and human rights activities of the UN and other organizations within the 
theater.210 In paragraph 13, the resolution emphasized that “the Agreement on Cessation 
of Hostilities links the termination of the UN peacekeeping mission with the completion 
of delimitation and demarcation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea border….” By early 2001, the 
UNMEE had already launched its operation on the ground. More than 40 countries 
participated, with Jordan, India and Kenya contributing the highest number of troops. The 
major contributors had infantry battalions stationed in sectors west, center, and east 
respectively.  
The UNMEE’s mandate was renewed every six months, “taking into account 
whether the parties had made significant progress in the delimitation and demarcation 
process.”211 In August 2002, the UN Security Council reconfigured (through resolution 
1430) UNMEE’s mandate to assist the EEBC in their work, including de-mining in key 
areas to help the demarcation process, and offering administrative and logistical support 
to field offices of the boundary commission.212  By May 2006, following changes in 
security and political environment in the Mission area, the UN Security Council 
decreased the military component to 2300 troops, with a mandate renewal every four 
months.213  
Since deployment in 2001, the UNMEE remained an effective buffer separating 
the two parties which had concentrated their troops along the common border. De-mining 
teams drawn from Slovenia, Bangladesh, and Kenya de-mined areas adjacent to the 
border freeing thousands of acres from both mines and unexploded ordinance (UXO). 
Despite its effectiveness in separating the two countries, the UNMEE faced critical 
challenges in its operational environment that proved detrimental to its existence. For 
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example, in September 2006, Eritrea cut fuel supplies to fifty percent of the Missions’ 
requirements.  This constraint forced the UNMEE to limit its operations and relocate 
some elements to Ethiopia.214 By December 2007, the UNMEE’s operations were 
completely deactivated when Eritrea completely severed fuel supplies to the 
peacekeepers. Not only did this further limit the Mission’s access to already restricted 
areas, it also undermined the safety and security of UN personnel, as all equipment – 
from evacuation vehicles to clinics, storage and communication systems – depended on 
diesel generators. Despite the Secretary General’s warning that “if the fuel supplies were 
not resumed immediately, the Mission would be forced to halt its operations and relocate 
from Eritrea,” Eritrea continued with fuel restrictions.215 
With the border standing virtually demarcated as of January 2008, Eritrea 
announced that it would not accommodate UNMEE forces in its territory any longer. In 
January 2008, President Issaias Afeworki informed the Security Council through a letter 
that since the border was virtually demarcated, the UNMEE’s continued existence inside 
the Eritrean territory amounted to occupation.216 The UNMEE was dealt a blow when 
Eritrea also cut off food supplies to UN forces in February 2008. Consequently, the UN 
was forced to pull its UNMEE forces from Eritrea and relocate them in Ethiopia while 
the Security Council debated modalities of operating from the Ethiopian side. Although 
Ethiopia accommodated the UNMEE and remained cordial to the UN, it also stated that if 
it were to host a new mission, its mandate should be decoupled from the EEBC—a 
demand which undermined a durable peace process and the UN peace efforts.217 On July 
30, 2008, the Security Council adopted resolution 1827, which terminated the UNMEE 
with effect from July 31. 
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Although Meles Zenawi has repeatedly stated that he is not going back into war 
with Eritrea,218 another round of clashes is imminent as both countries mobilized troops 
close to the border once UNMEE departed. Both countries continue to hold the largest 
armies in sub-Saharan African. The World Bank and the International Institute of 
Strategic Studies 2008 estimates indicate 320,000 and 138,000 troops for Eritrea and 
Ethiopia respectively.219 According to a proclamation that followed Eritrea’s 
independence in 1991, all Eritreans aged 18 to 40 years must undertake a 12 to 18 month 
compulsory military service.  
G. THE BOUNDARY COMMISSION 
 A neutral border commission referred to as the Ethiopia Eritrea Boundary 
Commission (EEBC), was established through Article 4 of the Algiers Agreement 
anchored on the notion that the demarcation of the border would permanently solve the 
crisis. The EEBC that consisted of eminent legal experts selected by the two parties was 
mandated “to delimit and demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial 
treaties (1900, 1902 and 1908) and applicable international law.”220 The mandate 
explicitly forbids the commission from making decisions ex aequo et bono.221 The two 
countries were in agreement that the findings of the EEBC would be final and binding, 
and would be followed by expeditious demarcation of the border. Thus, the commission 
was in essence given a dual mandate; both to delimit and demarcate the 1,000 kilometer 
boundary (See disputed areas in Figure 6).  
 The EEBC was officially constituted on February 20, 2001, when the president of 
the commission was appointed.222 In March 2001, the commission and the parties held 
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their first meeting in the Hague in which an agreeable tentative roadmap of border 
delimitation was formulated. After nearly a year of intensive work, the commission 
delivered its decision on April 13, 2002. The dense 125-page delimitation decision was 
composed of eight chapters, with accompanying maps and tables of grid coordinates. The 
decision was premised on two main issues: the provisions of colonial treaties and whether 
either party had established a credible administrative claim overriding the provisions of 
the treaties.223 
 Besides the provisions of the Algiers Agreement, the commission also made 
reference to the OAU principle of respecting colonial borders that existed at 
independence.224 In this case, the commission interpreted this principle as referring to the 
border that existed when Eritrea became independent on April 27, 1993. Any 
developments following that date were not considered relevant, unless they could be seen 
as continuance or confirmation of a line of conduct already clearly established or take the 
form of express agreement between the two countries.225 
1. Commission’s Ruling and Consequences 
  The western sector of the border which covers Badme is the most contested 
portion of the boundary. The delimitation decision of this sector was covered by the 
interpretation of the 1902 treaty. In the legal interpretation of the treaty, the commission 
considered the motive of the parties behind the signing of the treaty. An important clause 
in the treaty of 1902 was the parties’ agreement for the border to be delimited in such a 
manner that the “Cunama tribe could belong to Eritrea.” This was understood as a clear 
indication of the purpose the parties had in mind while signing the treaty. The 
commission was convinced that this reference to the Cunama tribe was to all parts of the 
Cunama territory.226  Based on this consideration, the commission’s final decision 
invalidated Ethiopian claims and awarded Eritrea all the land of the Cunama tribe which 
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included the contentious village of Badme. Further, based on the provision of the treaty 
and map evidence availed by both parties, the commission interpreted the straight-line 
section of the border such that it fell to the east of Badme, thus effectively placing the 
town inside Eritrea. In its decision, the commission concluded that: “These references 
represent the bulk of the items adduced by Ethiopia in support of its claim to have 
exercised administrative authority west of the Eritrean claim line. The commission does 
not find in them evidence of administration of the area sufficiently clear in location, 
substantial in scope or extensive in time to displace the title of Eritrea that had 
crystallized as of 1953.”227  
 
 
Figure 5.   Disputed areas in sectors west, center and east.228 
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Despite this clear decision, the commission did not show the exact location of 
Badme on the accompanying maps 2 and 10 as shown in Figure 8 and 9 respectively. The 
arbiters instead provided coordinates along which the border would lie, creating 
confusion and speculation. This lack of clarity prompted both parties to celebrate victory. 
In this regard, Ethiopia’s Foreign Minister, Seyoum Mesfin in a press conference said: 
The rule of the law has prevailed over the rule of the jungle. This decision 
has rejected any attempt by Eritrea to get any reward for its aggression. 
This decision was fair and legal. Badme and its surroundings which 
Eritrea invaded and occupied in May 1998 on the basis of false claims, it’s 
(sic) now been decided by the commission that Badme and its 
surroundings belong to Ethiopia….229 
Eritrea, on the other hand, criticized Ethiopia’s statement while declaring its own 
victory.230 Thanks to the confusion, for once all accepted the commission’s ruling. The 
parties were also contented with the commission’s findings for sectors center and east. 
However, when it became apparently clear to Ethiopia that Badme had been awarded to 
Eritrea, Ethiopia raised strong objection to the commission’s decision, but this could not 
influence any alteration of the decision as it was “‘final and binding.” The commission 
instead urged Ethiopia to comply with the decision and cooperate during the demarcation 
process.231 Attempts by Ethiopia to renegotiate the commission’s decision with Eritrea 
were unsuccessful as Eritrea clung to the legally correct position.  
2. The Stalemate  
In December 2003, Lloyd Axworthy, a former Canadian Foreign Minister was 
appointed by the UN Secretary General as a special representative to help revamp the 
peace efforts. Unfortunately, Eritrea neither accepted the appointment of Axworthy nor 
allowed him to visit Eritrea. Eritrea had interpreted his appointment as a scheme to sneak 
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in “the alternative strategy” of solving the conflict as earlier requested by Ethiopia. 
Eritrea’s adamancy has helped portray Ethiopia as being committed to the search for a 
solution to the conflict. However, in November 2004, Ethiopia came up with a five-point 
peace proposal. Within that five-point peace proposal, Ethiopia declared acceptance of the 
delimitation decision “in principle” and called for dialogue to the immediate implementation 
of the delimitation decision in a manner “consistent with the promotion of sustainable peace 
and brotherly ties between the two peoples” and with a view to future normalization of 
relations.232 The new proposal was aimed at improving the distorted public image of the 
country as defiant of international law.233 Eritrea severed its communications with both the 
EEBC and Ethiopia rendering demarcation impossible. In deferring demarcation in 2005, the 
chairman noted: “The commission must conclude by recalling of the line of the boundary was 
legally and finally determined by Delimitation Decision of 13 April 2002. Though un-
demarcated, this line is binding upon both parties, subject only to minor qualification 
expressed in the Delimitation Decision, unless they agree otherwise. Conduct inconsistent 
with this boundary line is unlawful.”234 
3. Breaking the Stalemate 
Eritrea, although favored by the EEBC’s findings, made demands for the 
international community to force Ethiopia to comply with its obligation, which, however, 
did not gain traction. Unlike Ethiopia which had demobilized a large part of its force 
since 2000, Eritrea had remained on war footing since the outbreak of hostilities in 1998. 
With 10 percent of its population engaged in war, the country was faced with serious 
social and economic difficulties that needed urgent attention.235 In October 2005, Eritrea 
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turned on the UNMEE and systematically started frustrating its operations through the 
restrictions on road movement, banning of helicopter flights, and restricting access to fuel 
and rations.236 The UNSC responded by passing resolution 1640 that threatened to 
impose economic sanctions on Eritrea unless it rescinded its restrictions on the UNMEE. 
The same resolution demanded Ethiopia to cooperate in order for demarcation to proceed 
without further delay.237 However, no party has complied with this resolution and 
subsequent diplomatic initiatives have remained largely unsuccessful as Eritrea has 
declined to attend meetings. 
4. Virtual Demarcation 
In August and November 2006, the commission tried to enter into dialogue with 
both parties but they declined. On November 20, guided by the provisions of the Algiers 
Agreement which demanded expeditious delimitation and demarcation of the contentious 
border, the commission notified the parties of its decision to mark the border using an 
alternative modern approach other than the actual ground demarcation. This method 
entailed the used of “image processing and terrain modeling” (virtual) in the 
emplacement of boundary pillars on the ground. The line joining the pillars would be the 
final demarcation in accordance with the 2002 Delimitation Decision.238 In adopting this 
approach, the commission used the precedent set in the virtual demarcation of the Iraq-
Kuwait border in 1993.239  The commission made available to the parties a list of pillars 
(coordinates) and 45 maps illustrating the emplacements. It also gave both parties a grace 
period of one year expiring November 2007 to agree on actual ground emplacement of 
the pillars or to enable the commission to resume its operations. Accordingly, if the 
parties had failed to comply, the border would automatically stand as demarcated and 
commission’s mandate would be fully executed. 
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Figure 6.   EEBC Map 2240 
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Figure 7.   EEBC Map 10241 
H. THE CLAIMS COMMISSION 
 The Claims Commission, chaired by Professor Hans van Hootte,242 was mandated 
under the Algiers Peace Agreement of 2000 which stipulated that the Commission would 
“decide through binding arbitration” all claims for loss, damage or injury (raised by one 
party against the other) resulting from war.243  
 The Commission assembled in March 2001 and started deliberations with the 
parties. The Commission partitioned claims with respect to areas [sectors], and 
sequentially heard the specific claims prior to issuing a report on collateral damage. The 
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first claims to be presented related to the execution of military operations, the handling of 
prisoners of war and civilians, as well as effect of the conflict on civilians and their 
property.244 Owing to the controversial nature of the issues under investigation, the 
hearing was done in camera, effectively locking out much publicity. In the east and 
central sectors, the Commission found that both parties had committed various atrocities 
that violated the UN charter. For instance, in the Zalambeza area within the central 
sector, Eritrea was found to have beaten and killed civilians. Eritrean soldiers also raped 
women in the Irobo area. Ethiopian soldiers, on the other hand, were found guilty of 
destruction of property and raping of women in Tserona and Senafe. Surprisingly, the 
port of Assab in the eastern sector was not under any dispute. 
In the western sector, Ethiopia filed a claim demanding compensation by Eritrea for 
launching planned and unprovoked attacks in violation of the UN Charter and international 
law.245 Eritrea responded by first challenging the authority of the Commission to 
adjudicate  the case invoking Article 3 of the Algiers Agreement which required the 
establishment of an independent commission to investigate the origins of the conflict. 
Eritrea argued that the Commission had no mandate to decide on Ethiopia’s claims. In 
defending itself, Eritrea argued that Ethiopia had been illegally occupying its territory, 
and had launched the attack on May 6 and 7, 1998, killing eight Eritrean soldiers. In 
addition, Eritrea argued that it acted in self defense over its sovereignty and that the 
military activities had been within its territory. 
 In its ruling, the Commission found Eritrea culpable of launching the incursion 
against Ethiopia. The Commission also asserted that Eritrea had used disproportionate 
force246 in response to a localized border skirmish, which did not amount to an armed 
attack as specified in the UN charter. In response to Ethiopia’s claim of premeditated  
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incursions, the Commission rejected it for lack of evidence. Implicitly, arising from this 
ruling, Eritrea would only pay the costs of the initial attack and not the cost for the entire 
duration of the conflict.  
 As noted earlier, the EEBC had awarded Badme to Eritrea. The Claims 
Commission on its part found Eritrea as the aggressor that triggered the border conflict by 
attacking Ethiopia in Badme, which was being administered by Ethiopia. The findings by 
the two Commissions, in effect, contradict each other.  
I. WHY HAS PEACE REMAINED ELUSIVE? 
 Despite heavy political and monetary investment by the international community 
for over ten years, considerable ground remains to be covered in order to obtain a durable 
solution to this conflict. With the border virtually demarcated, one is tempted to ask: Why 
has peace remained elusive? This section will endeavor to explain why and where actors 
involved and the peace process have failed.  
1. Weaknesses of the UNMEE 
 As seen above, the UNMEE was established under chapter VI of the UN charter 
as an observer to monitor cessation of hostilities in the AA1 June 18, 2000. The AA2 of 
December 12, 2000; established the EEBC to tackle the border issue. As such, the 
UNMEE concentrated on monitoring the TSZ and verifying compliance of the agreement 
and was detached from the core of the conflict—the border issue. Furthermore, even if 
there was any breach of the agreement, the UNMEE did not have the capacity to enforce. 
The UNMEE’s existence came to be tied with the completion of border demarcation 
through resolution 1430, yet it lacked a clear framework or mandate of enforcing 
decisions of the EEBC. According to a research fellow of the Norwegian Institute of 
International Affairs, Jon Lie, lack of political mandate or access to political players 
prevented the UNMEE from participating in political and mediatory forums that could 
have contributed to mission success.247 The UN was indecisive in reviewing the mandate 
of the UNMEE especially when it became apparent that the parties were withdrawing 
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consent (through imposition of restrictions) in order to undermine the peace process. 
Through restrictions imposed by Eritrea, the UNMEE became a hostage and therefore 
unable to fulfill its mandate.  
2. Weaknesses of EEBC 
a. Dual Mandate 
  In the AA2, the EEBC was given the dual mandate of delimitation and 
demarcation of the border. This had an advantage of harnessing the expertise obtained 
during the delimitation process to hasten the demarcation process. Nonetheless, this dual 
responsibility may have incentivized the party not favored by the delimitation decision to 
use the demarcation process to pressure the commission to adjust the delimitation 
decision. The case of the EEBC clearly illustrated this potential danger. Ethiopia 
launched a complaint against the delimitation decision as required by the demarcation 
process.248 According to Malcolm Shaw, the EEBC in effect demonstrated that 
combining the two mandates was troublesome and the best option would have been to 
phase the two processes and allow each to be executed by an independent body.249  
b. Insufficient Transparency 
  Although the EEBC delimitation was clear—putting Badme on the 
Eritrean side—the commission failed to indicate the exact location of Badme in the 
accompanying maps and thereby created speculation and confusion in the parties. This 
prompted both sides to claim victory from which it became extremely difficult to back 
down. The fact that oral hearings and written pleadings of the parties during the 
delimitation phase were done in private may also have been counterproductive. However, 
Martin Pratt argues that although it is common practice for the proceedings of border  
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arbitrations to remain confidential and for corresponding awards to be public, it is by no 
means obligatory. Public debates encourage informed assessments of positions and help 
dispel rumors.250 
c. Unrealistic Timeframe 
  In the Algiers Agreement of 2000, both parties committed themselves to 
prepare and submit claims within forty-five days from the day of endorsement, and the 
Commission was asked to submit a decision within six months from its first meeting. 
However, the commission took slightly over sixteen months to publish its decision which 
was extraordinary short period especially when compared to records set by similar 
commissions. 
  It can be argued that Ethiopia’s criticism of the EEBC of not taking 
adequate account of Ethiopia’s longstanding administration of the controversial Badme is 
a reflection of time constraint. Pratt notes that although Ethiopia’s claim for Badme was 
rejected for insufficient evidence, perhaps Ethiopia would have made a strong case if it 
had been given more time.251 The tight time framework pressurized the EEBC to 
continue with the delimitation of the border in the central sector even in the absence of 
suitable maps and aerial photographs. The delimitation was to be adjusted during the 
demarcation stage. These inconsistencies have served to undermine Ethiopia’s confidence 
in the EEBC. 
d. Inadequate Geographical Expertise 
  The EEBC was composed of a five-member team with vast experience in 
third party boundary adjudication, either as arbiters or advocates.252 Although the UN 
Cartographic Unit provided technical support to the EEBC as required by the AA2, the 
inclusion of a geographer as a permanent member of the team would have provided better 
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interpretation of complex geographical aspects of delimitation including the three old 
border treaties. According to Pratt, the UN Cartographers lacked sufficient practical skills 
in border demarcation (UN had only been involved in two border cases; the Kuwait-Iraq 
border in 1991–1993 and the Israel-Lebanon Withdrawal Line in 2000) and therefore 
provided limited support. The Commission also faced logistic constraints that made field 
visits impossible.253   
3. Failure of Diplomacy 
a. The Protagonists 
Both Eritrea and Ethiopia have been involved in liberation struggles and 
have developed strong political cultures in which compromise is equated with 
capitulation. Past mistrust and antagonism exacerbate the relationship between the two 
parties. With such cultures, chances for success of any outside diplomatic efforts are 
reduced. 
Since the end of the war in 2000, the leadership in both countries has 
faced serious criticism from their close inner circles, making them feel less secure and 
less confident of their position.254 Besides, according to Sally and Plaut, each party views 
the other as being on the verge of collapse and hence in no position to back down. This 
lowers their incentives to cooperate in the search for a lasting solution.255  
Although the status quo hurts the economies of both states, it favors 
Ethiopia in maintaining Badme, albeit at increased cost for maritime access. For Eritrea, 
on the other hand, political gains surpass border issues as the state retains overwhelming 
control over its citizens.   The country remains in a permanent state of emergency with 
press freedoms curtailed, political parties banned and youths forcibly conscripted into  
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military service. Eritrea’s failure to realize one of its independence proclamations—a 
high level of economic development—frustrates the leadership and hence results in 
reluctance in resolving the dispute.  
b. Unbalanced Contest 
Despite Meles Zenawi’s rejection of the virtual border demarcation, 
dismissing it as “a legal nonsense,”256 Ethiopia has exploited its diplomatic brilliance to 
mask its “legally weak position.” Eritrea’s diplomatic ineptness has allowed it to 
gradually lose the favorable decision of Badme. Eritrea exists in almost complete 
international isolation, thanks to its closure of any border discourse.257  
The unbalanced diplomatic contest arises from Ethiopia’s status—ties with 
the U.S. in the Global War on Terror; the only country in Africa never colonized; size 
and population; and that it hosts the African Union. Eritrea has been uncooperative with 
both the UN and the West. As Sally and Plaut aptly note, “Eritrea today is almost 
hermetically sealed from the outside world.” The international community has therefore 
been reluctant to compel its “amenable ally” (Ethiopia) to accept the verdict of the 
EEBC. 
c. Inept Agreement 
The Algiers Agreement was premised on the idea that border delimitation 
would permanently solve the dispute. In reality, the causes of the conflict were many and 
complex. The border disagreement was just one of the causes. According to Sally and 
Plaut, the mediation process cannot be blamed for focusing only on the border as neither 
of the protagonists was opposed to treating it as the core issue.258 The emphasis on 
delimitation diminished chances for maneuvers as the process could only produce a 
winner and a loser.  The mediation was hasty and simplistic, with both parties entering  
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into “final and binding” accord without understanding its full implications. Perhaps 
focusing on the consequences of the war rather than the causes would have created room 
for cooperation. 
The Agreement created the EEBC and the Claim Commission which gave 
contradictory outcomes in their findings. The EEBC awarded Badme village to Eritrea, 
which ratified Eritrea’s claim that it had been attacked within its territory and that it did 
not advance beyond the border. On the other hand, the Claim Commission found Eritrea 
guilty for launching an attack against Ethiopia in May 1998. These contradictory 
decisions, in part, hardened the belligerents’ positions thereby impeding possibilities of 
obtaining a final resolution. 
J. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has presented not only a case of failure of a state to establish a 
peaceful inter-state relationship (Ethiopia and Eritrea), but also a stand-alone example of 
the failure of both regional and international diplomacy, in which the OAU (now AU) 
displayed its ineptness in coping with conflict prevention and resolution in Africa. The 
role of the UN in this conflict is reminiscent of how differently the international 
community responds to conflicts and crises in Africa as compared with similar 
occurrences elsewhere. 
The conflict resolution approach adopted was narrow, focusing only on border 
delimitation rather than a comprehensive approach that would have offered greater space 
for maneuvering. The Algiers Agreement, though approved by both parties and witnessed 
by the international community, lacked the framework of enforcing the “final and 
binding” decision that arose from commissions set up under the agreement. The next 


















































V. TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE PEACE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 The protracted border impasse, the potential for resurgence of border clashes, the 
possibility of violent political dynamics resulting from totalitarianism in both Ethiopia 
and Eritrea, and the ways these challenges affect the entire horn of Africa and beyond, 
call for new and more nuanced comprehensive and coordinated initiatives. Deliberate 
conflict transformation policies, sustained high-level diplomatic engagements, 
willingness to take risks and accept costs, and grassroots reconciliation strategies offer 
the best hope for peace.  
B. SETTLING THE CONFLICT 
 Given the delicate nature of Ethiopia-Eritrean conflict and its linkage with other 
regional conflicts in Somalia, Sudan and the Nile Basin, there are two options that can be 
explored to bring lasting peace—political compromise and political federation. 
1. Political Compromise 
In order to end the border stalemate, the United States and other international 
actors must pressure Ethiopia to accept unambiguously the delimitation decision of the 
boundary commission. Ethiopia’s withdrawal from Badme will help ease tensions that 
might otherwise degenerate into a major conflict, pave way for physical demarcation,259 
and initiate comprehensive negotiations between parties. If Ethiopia declines, then 
Washington and other guarantors to the Algiers Agreement should categorically condemn 
the breaching of the peace agreement and punish Ethiopia by imposing economic and 
political sanctions.  
Although sanctions may bring peace, they might not lead to normalization of 
relationships. Once Ethiopia complies, further negotiations aimed at restoring mutually 
                                                 
259 The EEBC had indicated willingness to reconvene and proceed with the demarcation if the 
situation is permissive.   
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beneficial economic bonds, compensation for communities affected by the demarcation, 
and building trust between communities living along the border should be pursued.    
On the other hand, the UN, the United States of America and other diplomatic 
players should engage Eritrea with a view of refining the demarcation details to allow for 
a political compromise on Badme. Given the symbolic significance of Badme to the two 
countries, it could be placed under the sovereignty of a ‘joint dominion framework’ 
administered by both Ethiopia and Eritrea or under the sovereignty of one state with 
special rights granted to citizens of the other state.260 Once this is achieved, subsequent 
negotiations should address other avenues for cooperation that could be exploited to the 
benefit of the two countries. For example, Eritrea could develop its agricultural potential 
in the western arid areas using water from Tekeze River in exchange of allowing Ethiopia 
maritime access. The United States and European Union could support and finance the 
strategically placed Ethiopia to exploit its natural resources—gas reserves and water—so 
that it can export these energy resources to its neighbors including Eritrea. Exploitation 
and transportation of resources would require development of necessary infrastructure 
and security cooperation framework so that mutual benefits can be maximized. At 
present, the exchange of electricity from Ethiopia for Sudanese oil has eased relations 
between these two countries. Similar developments have been taking place in the 
Caucasus, where energy transportation and infrastructure networking has improved the 
relations between Georgia and Armenia on one hand and Georgia and Azerbaijan on the 
other.261 Transformation of the Ethiopia-Eritrea dispute into an energy-led cooperation 
and integration offer the best hope for sustainable peace in the region. 
                                                 
 260 In May 1999, a similar regime was used to resolve a border conflict between Peru and Ecuador,  in 
which Peru was granted private property rights to Ecuador in a 1km2 area around Tiwinzi—the site of 
heavy fighting between the two countries in 1995—symbolic of the sacrifices made by the two armies 
during the conflict.     
261 Hughes Butt Kent and Arthur L. Bradshaw Jr. (ed), “Caspian Sea: International Environmental 
Security Game,” Centre for Strategic Leadership, United States (1998), 13, at: http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-
bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA515654&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf (accessed August 29, 2010). 
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2. Political Federation 
Conditions have greatly changed in the Horn of Africa since Emperor Haile 
Selasie abrogated the Eritrean-Ethiopian federation in 1962, thereby triggering Eritrea’s 
liberation struggle.  The current political situation in the region appears favorable to 
regional or sub-regional integration and the introduction or development of federal 
structures. Leading by example is the East African Community (EAC) established by a 
treaty signed between Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania on November 30, 1999. These three 
countries established a customs union in 2005 and a common market in July 2010, and 
have since been joined by their neighbors Rwanda and Burundi. Modalities for common 
monetary union and currency are in progress—expected to be operationalized by 2012 
and 2015, respectively—climaxing with a political federation of East African States.262  
In the case of Eritrea and Ethiopia, there are special factors that make it necessary 
for them to strengthen their cooperation and integration. Integration will be easy because 
they share a common history, culture, and languages, and have also lived together under 
one political system. The constitution of 1952 may serve as the basis for the new federal 
dispensation. The reunification of Eritrea and Ethiopia will restore unity of the 
communities—Afars, Tigreans, Sahos, Bilens and the Cunama—that live on both sides of 
the border.  This reunion will diffuse the political differences and suspicions that have for 
nearly two decades hampered mutually beneficial cooperation. However, federation 
would only be possible when both societies are sufficiently democratized to a level 
conducive for genuine pluralism and federalism, where law is institutional than personal, 
where the masses are no longer objects of manipulation and deceit, but active participants 
in building their future, and where legitimacy and stability occur as a result of 
transparency and accountability. The civil society, Churches, intellectuals, Diasporas, 
youth and women should play a pivotal role in leading a new culture of dialogue and 
peace. Establishment of Ethiopia-Eritrea Peace Forum will be a step in the right direction. 
                                                 
262  New York Times, “East African Countries Form a Common Market,” at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/02/business/global/02africa.html (accessed September 1, 2010). 
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Federation will demand total reform of entire milieu, resulting to equality between 
the entities, which, in the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea, never existed. Ethiopia’s ethnic 
federal system must be overhauled because it is difficult to manage, especially as 
urbanization has mixed the regions and promotes ethnic tensions. Nor should secession 
remain a legal option. The Republic of South Africa offers an example of the benefits–
and the challenges–of depoliticizing ethnicity. 
One need only put together two statements to make concrete the argument that 
recasting a political union is not a farfetched proposal. During Eritrea’s Independence 
Day in 1993 Afeworki stated that, “I will not rule out establishing a confederation with 
Ethiopia,”263  words echoed by his Ambassador to Ethiopia who stated, “Forming an 
independent state was never the ultimate goal of our long struggle. Integration will be 
easier with Ethiopia as we share common history, culture, and languages, and have also 
lived together under a common political system.”264 The restoration of Ethiopia-Eritrea 
federation could serve as the focal point for economic cooperation and the integration of 
the Horn. A strategic exchange — Ethiopian hydro power for Eritrean Sea ports could 
revamp and transform their economies for the benefit of each country. 
It should also be noted that smaller nations face problems in an increasingly 
consolidating global economy if they fail to pool their social and physical capital.265 
Eritrea’s lack of sufficient natural resources coupled by its small size, make it an 
insignificant market for major manufacturers or distributors. World Food Programme 
Director for Eritrea Jean-Pierre Cebron recently observed that, even if Eritrea invested 
significant resources in its agricultural sector to double food production, it could only 
meet 40 percent of the country’s needs.266 Therefore, the consolidation of the two 
countries makes economic, as well as political, sense.  
                                                 
263 African Confidential, 30 April 1993. 
264 The Reporter, Addis Ababa, Vol. 1, No. 2, 18 September 1996. 
265 European Union brought together its historic enemies Germany and France forming a strong 
economic bloc. 
266 Martin Doornbos and Alemeseged Tesfai (eds), Post Conflict Eritrea: Prospects for 




Political compromise stands as the fastest means to bringing peace and stability in 
both Eritrea and Ethiopia. Unfortunately, due to domestic pressures and hardened stance 
taken by the leadership of both sides, concessions and trade-offs are unlikely in the 
immediate future. Badme has become a powerful symbol of a refusal to compromise in 
both countries and its significance as a stumbling block to progress will linger until 
cooler heads prevail to resolve the impasse. Integrating what was once already integrated 
may seem easy to outsiders, especially if this time federation of the two states took place 
in a more equitable manner than before. Federation would allow setting up a new 






















































VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
This study highlights the fact that the Ethiopia-Eritrea border is one more 
potential flashpoint in an already volatile Horn of Africa. The interstate war fought 
between the two countries in 1998-2000, although ostensibly over an obscure border 
outpost, in fact has deeper historical roots. According to Heldet, “a territorial dispute is 
virtually necessary but not a sufficient condition for interstate war.”
267
 The main 
underlying causes were political and economic. This thesis has argued that the cause of 
this war was due to political manipulation by the leadership of the two countries to serve 
their own political interests. After ascending to power, both TPLF and EPLF failed to 
address basic needs and aspirations of their people, and instead manipulated ethnic 
tensions and historical animosities in order to maintain total control. 
Despite heavy political and monetary investment by both regional and 
international actors, the border conflict remains unresolved. The mediators established 
the Algiers Agreement as a permanent framework for resolving the dispute through 
border delimitation, which was agreed upon by both parties as final and binding. 
Unfortunately, this agreement when coupled by EEBCs limitation on making decisions ex 
aequo et bono, merely produced a sense of winners and losers and short-circuited any 
prospects for dialogue. The Algiers Agreement lacked the enforcement mechanism and, 
because of the vagueness of Article 94 of the UN Charter and the Security Council’s 
reluctance to get involved in territorial disputes, Ethiopia’s violation of the agreement 
remains unchallenged. Indeed, the case of Ethiopia and Eritrea has confirmed the 
argument that any border dispute resolutions that perpetuate colonial era boundaries face 
serious challenges of legitimacy. Colonial borders were drawn with a practical disregard 
of the impact they would have on the local population. Therefore, any meaningful border 
                                                 
267 See note 106.   
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resolution initiative aimed at achieving sustainable peace should be broad-based and 
include the views of the local communities living along the border.  
As the international community labored to resolve the Ethiopian-Eritrean conflict, 
various lessons emerged. First, territorial disputes are very delicate and therefore 
delimitation of a sovereign territory should not be rushed even if it appears that 
establishment of a clearly demarcated border will mitigate hostilities between the 
belligerent parties. The time frame issued to the commission was unrealistic and may 
have been influenced by the desire to minimize costs related to maintenance of the 
peacekeeping force. This ‘rush’ forced the commission to make a decision—without 
adequate maps or even a site visit—that stymied the peace process and escalated the costs 
in the long run. Another important lesson is that third party adjudication can undisputedly 
be an effective tool for settling border disputes when both parties are ready to accept an 
imperfect outcome. Nonetheless, this method is a high-risk option because there is no 
inherent enforcement mechanism when one of the partners subsequently evades 
responsibility. The third lesson concerns the United Nations. The UN should only deploy 
personnel when there is a correct mandate in place. Mismatched mandates and 
indecisiveness of the Security Council both contribute to endangering the lives of UN 
personnel and the failure of the mission.    
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
•                  There is strong need for the international community to be just as 
committed in encouraging compliance with decisions of international 
judicial bodies as they are in mediating for the creation of such 
agreements. 
•                   Arbitration agreements must be clear, precise, and contain stringent 
enforcement mechanism to ensure compliance and avoid protracted 
disputes. 
•                     Due to the sentimental significance of Badme to the two countries, it 
should be placed under the sovereignty of a ‘joint dominion framework’ 
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administered by both Ethiopia and Eritrea or under the sovereignty of one 
state with special rights granted to citizens of the other state, or be placed 
under administration of a neutral body like the United Nations.  
•                     The Ethiopian and Eritrean Diasporas should be incentivized to actively 
engage in discourse in order to conquer their divisions and to formulate 
new approaches of overcoming the protracted disputes in their homeland.  
•                     The is need for elites, civil society, churches, women and the opposition 
parties in both countries to pressure their governments to embrace  
democracy and a culture of dialogue.  
•                    The international community should as a matter of priority resolve this 
conflict, as this will ameliorate security in the Horn and open dialogue for 
resolving the conflict over the Nile River.  
•                    Multi-national donors should help Ethiopia to harness its energy 
resources so that it can export to its neighbors. This will result to energy-
led political cooperation in the Horn. 
•                    Both Ethiopia and Eritrea should be encouraged to work together towards 
a cooperative framework to leverage their respective advantages to create 
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